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Abstract

Under the puzzling circumstances of a strong domestic economy and the relatively stable
mainstream policymaking of the incumbents, Law and Justice (PiS), a right-wing populist
party, momentously won the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland. Using
a comparative approach, the thesis examines the structural forces and policy
dimensions/goals, which have provided the necessary conditions for the populist right-wing
program to appeal to a wide variety of demographic groups, resulting in an electoral victory
and to some degree in the redrawing of political and social boundaries. The conducted field
study served as a hypothesis-generating exercise to gauge the voter sentiment informally in
Poland. Based on the empirical data from a sample comprised of Poland’s seven postcommunist democratic counterparts, statistical models depictive of combinations of
structural exogenous conditions, as well as policy packages of political parties, were
recorded in an effort to capture cross-national similarities and differences, and to shed light
on key success factors that systematically contribute to the rise of right-wing populism in
modern Eastern Europe. The empirical analysis was supplemented with widely cited
scholarship on the topic of populism, populist adaptation, and populist politics.
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Chapter I
Introduction

"Every established order tends to make its own entirely arbitrary system
seem entirely natural."
— Pierre Bourdieu (1977)
The wide array of processes, human actions, and policies, which gave rise to
globalization[1]—resulted in a creation of an international web of politics and
intergovernmental institutions, an interdependent global economy, and new cultural
instruments of social engagement. Despite such monumental strides toward greater global
progress, the public sentiment on the defining force of the 21st century world is negatively
changing (Ghemawat 2017). This is demonstrated by Brexit, the election of President
Trump and his protectionist goals, the strengthened position of radical nationalist
movements from 2012 to 2018, the heightened negative media sentiment on the topic of
globalization, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the damped
international commerce activity (i.e., foreign direct investments) (Ghemawat 2017). These
are only few selected manifestations that point to the doubts of citizens and institutional
actors about prosperity gained as a result of a more open/interconnected world coconstructed by the forces of globalization. A defining externality of the public’s discontent
with the globalized world order is the rise of populist “ultra-right” parties in Europe
(Ghemawat 2017)—which is the primary area of research covered in the thesis. Daniele
Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, political scientists and experts in the field of modern
populism, define contemporary populism “as an ideology that pits a virtuous and
homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together
depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values,
prosperity, identity, and voice” (2008:3). The context-dependent and multifaceted/elastic

[1]

The definition referred to is globalization as internationalization, i.e., “intensification of cross-border interactions
and interdependence between countries” (Scholte 1993, 15). This is experienced across political, economic,
cultural, and social domains.
5

phenomenon of populism is of particular interest to social scientists as this form of social
and political change, or perhaps public outcry, affects and is affected by a changing
international relations landscape. Figure 1 demonstrates the popularity of European
populists (across the political left-right spectrum) at the end of 2016. Remarkably, in
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary populist parties are popular amongst more than
50 percent of likely voters.
Figure 1: Popularity of Populist Parties in Europe (Q4 2016)

Evidently populist governments did not rise to power in the majority of the European Union
(EU) or the world, and long-term unemployment in most of the EU member states is on the
decline since 2013—additional factors must explain the recent advancement of populist
movements (Gros 2016). This inquiry brings me to the analysis of the intriguing presentday political climate in Poland and Eastern Europe. The overarching research question of
6
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the thesis is—why and how did a populist party win the momentous 2015 Polish elections
and whether a systemic development of right-wing populism can be traced in present-day
Eastern Europe; and if so, under what structural conditions and policy package proposition?
One of the primary examples of successful (in terms of social influence and voter
share) right-wing populist parties in present-day Europe is the Polish Law and Justice party
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc; abbreviated to “PiS”). The party rose to power in 2015 during
Poland’s most recent parliamentary and presidential elections. The PiS candidate, Andrzej
Duda, won the 2015 presidential election with 51.5 percent of the votes (8,630,627 votes),
while the Civic Platform (abbreviated to “PO”) incumbent, President Komorowski lost with
48.5 percent of the vote share (8,112,311 votes) (Reuters). Remarkably, this was the
closest presidential election in Polish history. The overall turnout in the final round of voting
was recorded at 55.34 percent (Reuters). In terms of parliamentary elections—PiS won
with 37.58 percent of the votes (235 seats out of 460, granting first in 25 years absolute
majority/single-party government), while the Civic Platform gained 24.09 percent of the
vote share (138 seats) (Reuters). The voter turnout amounted to 50.92 percent of total
population registered to vote (Reuters). Chapter III provides a detailed analysis of the
2015 Polish elections, along with an overview of the civil/structural forces that contributed
to Poles’ drive/inclination towards the right-wing populist program.
The victory of Law and Justice can be interpreted as an intellectual puzzle, whereby
Poles chose to forgo a liberal-conservative, pro-European Union, pro-market representative
in favor of a populist (and based on past years in office somewhat turbulent/controversial)
right-wing party focused on anti-establishment and heightened social welfare policy goals
(Cienski 2015). Relevantly, in 2015 and during the years following up the elections, Poland
had a strong domestic economy and growth outlook/risk profile, suggesting at least
somewhat successful rule of the incumbent party (Cienski 2015). In addition to being
intellectually puzzling, the 2015 elections also appear as a momentous event in Polish
politics. This is highlighted by the sharp rise in public protests and grassroots movements
7

and a clear ideological divide/polarization amidst the Polish people witnessed after the party
took office (Llana 2016). In fact, currently both conservatives and liberals are protesting
against PiS’ anti-democratic reforms (e.g., a law which prohibited media to be present
during parliamentary meetings; restructuring of the Supreme Court, which undermined the
independence of the judicial branch, i.e., Constitutional Tribunal scandal) and social reforms
(e.g., women protesting the abortion ban). Negative economic effects are likewise starting
to manifest, as the nation experienced a weakest annual GDP growth in three years—
immediately following the elections (Bouzanis).
In this thesis, I investigate why Law and Justice won the 2015 elections and search
for the primary political, economic, and social conditions that set the platform for successful
voter mobilization/engagement by the right-wing populist party. The research is performed
as a country-level and party-level comparative study of Poland’s case in relation to those of
its Eastern European democratic/post-communist counterparts: Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. My general hypothesis is that a
combination of causes contributed to this political and social transformation. Some of which
include the anti-communist/anti-elitist sentiment left over from the Soviet-led rule, which
was aligned with PiS’ streamlined narrative of the glorious/heroic past; the loss of PO’s
charismatic leadership; a strong domestic economy, which enabled the populist party to
promise additional social welfare benefits; and, the strategic alliance between the PiS party
and the Catholic Church/religious media, which provided an undisputed outreach platform.
Given the general hypothesis and the findings of my literature review

[2]

on the topic

of contemporary populism, six country-level comparison criteria points were selected. Here,
I aim to discover if there were any social/economic/cultural commonalities in the eight
comparison countries, in order to draw appropriate conclusions about the systematic
growing popularity of right-wing populists in Eastern Europe, and perhaps come across a

[2]

The work of experts in the field of populism—such as Maragret Canovon, Daniele Albertazzi, Duncan McDonnell,
and Paul Taggart—was analyzed as part of the literature review. The full analysis is found in chapter I.
8
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“formula” for the advancement of contemporary right-wing populism in post-communist
countries. Figure 2 highlights the primary comparison criteria points and provides a
summarized rationale for each independent variable. The dependent variable is the total
vote share of right-wing populist parties in a designated nation. I wish to identify the
structural environment in which a European right-wing populist program may best succeed.
Figure 2: Primary Comparison Criteria Points
Criteria
X1:
Post-communist
Sentiment
Democratic
Sentiment/
Satisfaction with
Democratic Way of
Life

Rationale
Due to 44 years of Soviet-led communist control, strong anticommunist and anti-Russia sentiment continues to exist in Poland
today. Despite the Republic’s successful political/economic
transition into a democratic state, the popularity of PiS’ rhetoric of
dichotomy (the people vs. the establishment) may stem off the
anti-communist/anti-elitist sentiment left over from the Soviet rule.
I analyze whether the public’s distrust of institutions and the PiS
party’s call against corruption, is the factor that significantly
influenced the voter behavior in the 2015 elections.
Key Data Parameter(s): European Commission Public Opinion:
Survey on Satisfaction with Democracy (Within Country)

X2:
Economic Growth

Poland’s favorable position during the global financial crisis of 2008,
the model economic growth post 2004 EU membership, and the
expansion of urban infrastructure—all occurred under the rule of
the Civic Platform party. Poles chose to forgo the conservative
stability and predictability of PO’s economic policy. Stable domestic
economy allowed PiS to propose a political agenda with increased
social welfare benefits.

Questions
Considered
How does the postcommunist sentiment
affect voting today?
How did Poland’s
favorable postcommunist position
affect its political
democratic
environment?

Despite the strong
economic growth,
why did Poles choose
the populist party?

Key Data Parameter(s): Annual GDP Per Capita; Annual
Unemployment; Annual Inflation

X3:
Religious Influence

The majority of Poles (87.2 percent) identifies with Catholicism,
which plays a critical role in political life (CIA World Factbook). The
Polish population is relatively homogenous. PiS holds close ties
with religious media outlets, which serve as critical tools for the
party’s political outreach. The Catholic Church is a strong ally of
PiS, despite the constitutional separation of church and state. The
Catholic Church appears to be most influential in rural regions. PiS
galvanized support in the majority of Polish rural regions.
Key Data Parameter(s): European Commission Public Opinion: Trust
in Religious Institutions Survey; Rural Population (Percent of Total
Population)

X4:
Immigration and
European Union
Sentiment

The Polish civil society is relatively homogenous in terms of
ethnicity and race. The anti-EU/anti-migrant rhetoric and negative
public sentiment toward migrants, who do not appear similar to the
status quo Pole, is popular within the media and public discourse.
The issue of refugee crisis is closely related to the European Union,
given its mandates for nation states to accommodate asylum
seekers.

While spiritual power
played a key role in
abolishing
communism, can it
also be the driving
force of right-wing
populism in Poland?

Was PiS' anti-migrant
rhetoric the crucial
selling point for its
electorate, given
Poland's homogenous
demographics?

Key Data Parameter(s): Ethnic Fractionalization Index; Refugee
Population by Country or Territory of Asylum/International Migrant
Stock (Percent of Total Population)
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Despite Poland’s successful post-communist transformation into a
democratic state, the popularity of PiS’ authoritarian-like rhetoric
and actions appears to be growing.
X5:
Inclination Towards
Authoritarian Rule

X6:
Loss of Party
Leader
Weak Party
Campaign

Key Data Parameter(s): The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy
Index

Donald Tusk, the charismatic leader of the Civic Platform, resigned
in Sept. 2014, when he was appointed to the position of President
of the European Council. Internal party powerstruggles/disagreements occurred, which set stage for a convenient
platform for PiS to promote its new presidential candidate, when PO
was undergoing transitional conflicts and putting less efforts/focus
into the reelection campaigns.
Key Data Parameter(s): “Yes/No” Indication

Was PiS’
authoritarian-like
rhetoric a strategic
political tactic?
Was the Polish
democracy in poor
shape or perceived to
be as such by
voters?
Did PiS simply “luck
out” on its timing?
In the past, did the
Poles vote for Civic
Platform (the party)
or for Donald Tusk
(the party’s leader)?

To analyze comprehensively the phenomenon of populism I supplement the
structural (country-level) analysis with an agency-focused (party-level) empirical
examination. For the party-level analysis, I use data found in the widely cited Chapel Hill
Expert Surveys (2014) to report on party ideology location patterns (on policy positions
directly related to the country-level independent variables) of right-wing parties in the
selected eight countries. Based on this data, I first identify the right-wing populist parties
with economic/social policy stands that closely resemble (in terms of degree of right-wing
extremeness/leaning) PiS’ agenda. Following, I report on any key statistical correlations
present between the parties’ policy stances and their electoral success. Here, I wish to find
the most successful (on the grounds of maximizing vote share; and, based on correlation
projections) policy package that a modern right-wing populist program may offer.
To execute both the country-level and party-level research, I additionally conduct
discourse-analysis on secondary sources, such as scholarly literature and think tank reports
on modern populism and voter behavior/psychology. I supplement the data/literature
investigation with the findings of the small-scale public survey (N=40) on the topic of voter
preferences during the 2015 elections, which I have conducted in Bialystok, Poland
(January, 2018). My field study served as a hypothesis-generating exercise to gauge

10
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informally voter sentiment absent of media bias. The results serve as anecdotal evidence
given the small sample of the study. The survey/interview template used during the field
study, along with the results, is found on page 109.
The thesis is organized in the following order. First, in chapter II, I present the
reader with selected theory on contemporary populism, which I have chosen as part of my
literature review. In the following chapter, I provide the comprehensive results of my
small-scale public survey, which empowered/contributed to my hypothesis. Next, I describe
in detail the key structural socio-economic forces in Poland witnessed in the years following
up to 2015, and provide analysis of the country’s most recent parliamentary and
presidential elections. Chapter IV presents the empirical country-level analysis, while
chapter V covers the party-level dimension. Finally, the last chapter reports on key
conclusions and looks ahead on the future of Poland with the context of right-wing
populism.

11

Chapter II
Contemporary Populism: A Legitimate Threat to Liberal Democracy?

The study of “populism” interconnects the political, social, and economic domains.
Currently the phenomenon is of particular relevance and academic/secular popularity due to
the turbulent global political/social landscape characterized by intensifying cleavages,
especially on the grounds of cultural values. The term is elusive and confrontational as
there is little consensus within the academic circles on what populism actually is and what is
its true form. Nevertheless, the undisputed foundation of the occurrence is that “populism
worships the people,” which in turn produces an ample platform for social and political
change to ignite (Ionescu and Gellner 1970, 4). The purpose of this chapter is to provide
the reader with the theoretical frameworks of contemporary populism and to highlight its
relevance today, in terms of the global state of democratic and liberal traditions, and its
growing success in voter mobilization. Given the primary case study of the thesis is the
Polish right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) and a multitude of types of populism exists in
literature—I will chiefly focus on right-wing anti-establishment populism and authoritarian
populism. Additionally, special attention will be paid to present-day Europe and its selected
populist political actors, such as PiS.
I.

The Elastic Concept(s) of “Populism”
The term “populism” is a relatively elastic, yet complex, concept in the realm of

political science and international studies. Its assigned meaning has been frequently
modified throughout modern history, which contributed to the emergence of multiple types
of populism, such as right-wing, left-wing, authoritarian/anti-establishment, cultural,
religious—to name a few. Paul Taggart, a renowned scholar of populism, highlights the
context-dependent adaptability and ambiguity of the phenomenon with a useful anecdote:
“populism has an essential chameleonic quality that means it always takes on the hue of the
environment in which it occurs” (2012:2). The justification behind the practical and
12
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theoretical flexibility of populism may be related to the nature of its core focus. Since the
term has its roots in the Latin word “populous,” which translates to “the people”—the
essence of (any type of) populism is “the people”, i.e., ”the masses” (Munro 2018). Given
this key focal point, a question that arises and is seen frequently in literature is whether
populism poses a threat to democracy or in fact, is a natural and important part of the
democratic tradition.
A. Definition of “Populism” in the Academic Sphere
First usage of the term “populism” can be traced back to the United States at the
end of 19th century were the idea was used to describe a form of political discourse and
political participation, thus representative of analyzing the concept from a theoretical
perspective of party politics (Urbinati 1998, 110). Yet, in the modern-day academic sphere,
the concept is broadened in scope and chiefly represents an ideological worldview or a
political philosophy, rather than merely a political strategy. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan
McDonnell, political scientists and experts in the field of modern populism, define
contemporary populism “as an ideology

[3]

that pits a virtuous and homogeneous people

against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or
attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and
voice” (2008:3). The scholars’ perspective “avoids conceiving of populism in terms of
specific social bases, economic programs, issues and electorates,” which are factors that
may possibly limit the scope of analysis and miss populism’s “crucial [context-dependent]
specificity” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 3). The early analysts of populism frequently
assumed “that the common ground they were looking for must be a socio-economic base;
[while] more recent studies tend to focus on populist discourse, a rhetoric of appeals to ‘the
people’” (Canovon 2004, 242). In the thesis I use Albertazzi and McDonnell’s definition of
populism to guide my research question. I chose this contemporary interpretation as it is

[3]

Oxford Dictionary defines ideology as “a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of
economic or political theory and policy.”
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widely cited in the field/literature and its encompassing nature provides explanatory power
to tackle the multifaceted and context-dependent variations/functions of populist programs.
Experts of populism have analyzed the phenomenon from multiple theoretical
perspectives ranging from the discussed above party politics, and political
psychology/philosophy, to modernization theory and beyond (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013,
1). A widely accepted scholarly definition of populism from a standpoint of a social/political
movement—proposed by Maragret Canovon, a renowned expert in the field—depicts the
concept “as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and
the dominant ideas and values” (2002). Conovan’s outlook is particularly worthwhile to
mention as it explains why populism is frequently categorized as an “anti-establishment” or
a “non-mainstream politics” proposition in political commentary/public discourse on politics
and related literature. For example, Amir Abedis—a political scientist whose work focuses
on right-wing populist parties—equalizes in meaning the terms populism and antiestablishment. According to his theory, a party can be categorized as anti-establishment if
it “challenge[s] the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues;
perceive[s] itself as a challenger to the political establishment; [and] assert[s] a
fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people” (Heino 2017, 6).
Two parties, which fit these criteria, are the Polish Law and Justice party and the Hungarian
Fidesz party.
B. Definition of “Populism” in the Popular Media and Public Discourse
In the modern popular media and everyday vocabulary, the term “populism” has
been understood as twofold. First, as a political program that champions the ordinary
person and proposes an antagonistic contrast to the mainstream political parties and/or
elites, and second, as a partisan/ideological label, that frequently is part of a political attack
(Heino 2017, 5). The conventional wisdom usage of the term is in fact representative of
populism from a theoretical perspective of political strategy/party politics. Under these
particular circumstances, the term “almost always refers to the less than admirable
14
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practices of politics: vulgar rhetoric, weak or nonexistent claims of political consistency,
opportunism” (Heino 2017, 5). Critically, such characteristics are not unique to populist
programs. In fact, all political parties, regardless of ideological standing, implement traces
of a populist rhetoric and use it as a political strategy, specifically formulated to capture the
preferences of the electorate (Heino 2017, 5). The detailed analysis of political discursive
strategies used by populist leaders/parties is found in the next subsection of this chapter.
The somewhat demonizing usage of the term within the public sphere reduces its
importance and value as an intellectual tool of social science analysis (Heino 2017, 5). Due
to the negative connotation in the public commentaries associated with the term, a populist
naturally does not label herself/himself as one. Maragret Canovon notes that the
phenomenon exposed in the popular media is a development of the 1990’s and is identified
as “New Populism.” The concept is denoted as a “collection of movements, broadly on the
right of the political spectrum, that have emerged in many established liberal democracies,
challenging existing parties and mainstream policies” (Canovon 2004, 242).
The elastic nature of populism is also underscored by the broadness of political and
social environments in which the ideology is successful (on the grounds of social
influence/impact and voter share). The majority of scholars agree that the phenomenon is
highly compatible with any political ideology (i.e., left-wing/right-wing,
reactionary/progressive, reformist/ revolutionary), economic background (ranging from
state-planned to neo-liberal), and social base (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 4-5).
Moreover, such non-limiting compatibility of populism makes the analysis of it more
puzzling but also particularly relevant given that it appears that any nation state can
experience the ideology in its unique form, which is majorly influenced by the
preferences/inclinations of the citizens.
Critically, populism is not equivalent or synonymous with ideological extremes by
default (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 3-5). This suggests not all populists can be
properly identified as “radical,” yet nevertheless based on precedent many are. An example
15

of a populist party that is not ideologically extreme or radical is the Swiss People’s Party
(Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union Démocratique du Centre), whose key goal is to preserve
the existing liberal democracy (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 4). The key qualifications
for the categorization of a radical populist party are described in the third subsection of this
chapter on page 21.
II.

“A Trust Inducing Community:” Defining Features/Strategies of Populist
Parties/Leaders
Given the foundation of populism is “the people,” the sense of community (provided

by the populist political actors) experienced and/or perceived by the citizens is critical to the
populist voter mobilization/engagement and the ideology itself. Zygmunt Bauman, Polishborn sociologist and philosopher, describes this community as a place where the masses
feel “‘warm’ and ‘safe,’ where there is mutual trust [and there exists a clear understanding
of] (…) who is ‘one of us’ and who is not” (Bauman 2001, 12). This best demonstrates the
core populist rhetoric that creates and/or overemphasizes a social dichotomy between “the
people” and the symbolic “enemy”/antagonistic “stranger,” or the familiar “good” and the
alien “evil.” The identifying of “the people” by most populists appears to be troubling, as it
does not include the polity as a whole, excludes the “privileged” groups (e.g., elites,
business groups), and cherry-picks the “common men,” representative of the “silent”
majority (Canovan 2004, 247-249). Historically this has also led to exclusions and/or
hostility towards stigmatized minorities who are not perceived as a homogenous and/or
virtuous part of the status-quo voter group (i.e., “the people”) in the populist
narrative/illusion (Bauman 2001, 12). The symbolic enemy or “the other” is more times
than not “accused of conspiring together against the people, who are depicted as being
under siege from above by the elites and from below by a range of dangerous others”
(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 5). This dynamic is built on a scenario of a feared villain
and a hero—the virtuous populist leader who leads the, now unified by common source of
fear/anxiety, nation to a symbolically trust-inducing victory over the constructed enemies.
16
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The demonization of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, alien to the threatened
European status-quo voter, comes to mind.
The constructed community, or what Paul Taggart refers to as the “populist implicit
or explicit heartland,” resembles a social utopia-like[4] environment. The streamlined
narrative, which builds and reinforces the validity/power of the heartland in the civil society,
strategically constructs a “version of the past that celebrates a hypothetical, uncomplicated
and non-political territory of the imagination. From the imagination of this ‘place’, it tends to
draw its values (…) and own vision of its natural constituency – unified, diligent and
ordinary” (Taggart 2012, 2). By the same token, populists create illusions in which the past
was a utopic-like (or closest to it) environment that perished due to the actions of the
“enemies.” Following, the populist leaders vow to restore the glory of the past order and
“return sovereignty [and voice/power] to the people” (Taggart 2012, 1-2). This politically
expedient discursive strategy is psychologically influential as it induces a heightened sense
of loss, individual/systematic oppression, and backwardness of progress in the eyes of the
voters. This is evidenced by the work of poststructuralist philosopher Michel Foucault.
Since power is diffused across all levels of society and operates through people—the
overarching mechanism of power, thus control, is discourse—which produces “a body of
knowledge”/”regimes of truth”, impacting all relationships, and thus serving as a key factor
in the production of our reality (Foucault 1990). Hence, a divisive and value-assigning on
the moral grounds of “good” and “evil” populist narrative may be a persuasive source of
alternative-reality-creating propaganda; and, thus may affect the social order of a nation
state. On the other side of the spectrum, a unifying populist narrative whose aim is to fight
actual/legitimate oppressors has the potential to be uplifting and highly transformative.
This is best exemplified by the achievements of Lech Walesa of the Solidarnosc party, who
with his populist narrative was able to unify the then communist Poland and inspire a
[4]

Simply put, utopia is a “term for an imagined place where everything is perfect. It has been used to describe an
imaginary world where the social justice is achieved as well as the principles that could guarantee it. Utopia
symbolizes people's hopes and dreams” (utopiaanddystopia.com).
17

collective revolt against the corrupt governing system in favor of a more stable democratic
republic (Segel 2012).
The key question that emanates then is: why is the particular concept of
community/solidarity a universal appeal to the voters and to humans in general? This
fundamental human inclination has been of significant interest especially to the existentialist
and postmodern thinkers—yet, the beginnings of the intellectual debate can be traced back
to the ancient world (Jay 2018). The concept of “alienation” appears to be especially
noteworthy, while answering the posed question. Alienation is defined as “feeling estranged
– whether from one’s personal or communal identity, one’s creations, or the human species
as a whole,” which consequently sets a platform for an individual experience of “profound
dismay” (Jay 2018). In practical terms, this translates as feeling disconnected with the self
and the surrounding community. Up until the so called “Linguistic Turn” of the 1970’s,
thinkers assumed that “a unified, holistic self or community was inherently superior to their
opposites,” which would sufficiently explain the voters’ drive towards a solidarity-creating
populist program (Jay 2018). Yet, the debate became more complex when scholars started
to question this critical assumption, shifting the focal point of analysis from the idea of a
superior wholeness to the now preferred multiplicity/multidimensionality of oneself and
community (Jay 2018). Hence, the answer to our leading question is supplemented by
another key feature of alienation.
Correspondingly, another chief aspect of alienation interrelated with populism is the
“anxiety about the power of the other, the foreigner, the stranger – in short, ‘the alien’”
(Jay 2018). Importantly, the figure of “the alien” corresponds to the figure of “the enemy”
in the populist narrative. In fact, alienation suggests “the corrosion of a coherent,
autonomous self, a strong and sovereign entity [; and,] implies the superiority of the
domestic over the foreign, the friend over the stranger, the settled over the vagabond” (Jay
2018). This sentiment is directly implemented and reflected in the populist/nationalist
rhetoric and political agenda. Perhaps, the social condition of alienation in the postmodern
18
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world produces/reinforces a politically expedient anxiety experienced by the citizens, who
then find the populist program—which exposes “the alien” allegedly responsible for these
threatening feelings—particularly appealing. The elasticity and context-dependence of
populism is again highlighted, as the “alien” can be a domestic corrupt political elite, a
group of migrants, or whomever else the illusion deems as the feared/antagonized
“stranger.”
The particular form populism takes and functions as is, as mentioned earlier,
dependent on the specific circumstances of each nation-state and its people. In modernday Europe, populism “has fused with agendas of anti-immigration, minority nationalism,
Euroscepticism, anti-Islam and welfare chauvinism” (Taggart 2012, 1). These issues are
not surprising choices, given they all have an anti-alien, nationalist underlying foundation
that is based on the “us” vs. “them” binary—a key-identifying feature of populism.
Inevitably, these dichotomy-creating positions have the power to reinvent social and
political boundaries, alongside cultural/moral values.
Moreover, Figure 3 highlights some principal policy goals of populists (across the
ideological political spectrum) in Europe today. It appears that the anti-Eurozone and antiestablishment positions are the most frequently implemented parts of a European populist
package, according to the New York Times data. It is not a coincidence that all of the
included policy goals (excluding anti-austerity), base their focal view on either a fear of
social change/opportunity of international, rather than domestic per se, progress, and/or of
the alleged “other” antagonistic group within a “unified” nation state. The indicated angsts
are perceived as anxiety-creating social/economic threats in the eyes of the status quo
voters—and as a habitat for a “saving”/”heroic” policy package from a perspective of a
populist candidate. Although Poland was not included in the NYT dataset, but based on
content in the popular media prior to and post the 2015 elections, Law and Justice reflects
all of the highlighted policy categories. A detailed analysis of the party’s policy package
based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey is found in chapter VI.
19

Figure 3: Populists in Europe Today—Key Policy Positions At A Glance

Data Source: The New York Times (2016)

Populist agendas are also usually ambiguous and use personifying [strategies] as “a
way of by-passing many of the difficulties of complex issues and processes” (Taggart 2012,
1). As a result, populist parties frequently close down and downgrade the depth of public
debate on representative politics and crucial social issues, and “feed an anti-politics that
reduces politics as an activity and further feeds distrust in the complexity of politics”
(Taggart 2012, 1). The majority of populists “partly or entirely reject the long-standing
foundation of Western Liberal democracies, i.e. separation of powers, transparency, and
individualism” (Heino 2017, 4). Furthermore, the populist style chiefly operates as “‘politics
of redemption” with a “revivalist flavor of a movement,” as opposed to the
mainstream/establishment “politics of pragmatism” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 2).
This is demonstrated by their fight for a more influential voice/representation of the people
in governmental processes, and party leaders who purposely remain as an ordinary member
of “the people” (i.e., “in terms of their vocabulary, attire, declared pastimes”) (Albertazzi
and McDonnell 2008, 5). Additional characteristics that have been embodied by populist
leaders in the past and which are denoted in literature but not yet mentioned in the chapter
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are: charismatic and strong leadership style that captures the interests/will of the people, a
nationalist/ethnocentric-like rhetoric, which attacks business groups (e.g.,
corporations/banks), and a protectionist outlook on the economy. Given the flexibility and
context-specificity of populism, these characteristics are by no means indicative of a
“typical” populist leader—since it appears that such distinction has no real meaning.
III.

The Blurred Lines of “Authoritarian Populism” and “Extreme/Radical RightWing Populism”
The term “authoritarian populism” was invented by cultural theorist/sociologist

Stuart in 1985. The scholar defined the concept as “the use of popular discontents as a
conscious strategy for the construction of a populist ‘common sense’ that can be used to
justify exceptional levels of government intervention into civil society” (Makovicky 2013,
78). The scholar used the term to explain the rise of Margaret Thatcher in the United
Kingdom, i.e., “Thatcherism,” and the occurrence of “Reaganism” in the United States.
According to Hall, the radicalism of authoritarian populists “connects with radical-popular
sentiment; but it effectively turns them round, absorbs and neutralizes their popular thrust,
and create, in the place of a popular rupture, a populist unity”—which serves as a platform
for a political victory and a strengthened position of moral leadership by the ruling party
(Hall 1983, 54). Powerful moral leadership is a key feature of a successful populist
program. Interestingly, it is also a focal point of hegemony. Hall posits that the two iconic
leaders, Reagan and Thatcher, were able to mobilize successfully the crucial-to-victory
working class vote chiefly because the Labour Party and the Democratic program “offered
no convincing alternatives to the neo-liberal capitalist policies of the Tory Party and the
Republicans against the ‘corporatist state’ and in favor of smaller government, against
organized labor, for zero-tolerance policing, for tighter immigration control, and for
restricted social welfare programs” (Agozino 2016). More recent academic research shows
that today the authoritarian populist is identified by its core anti-liberal, yet democratic
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principals/agenda and is not limited to the rightist or the leftist ideological leaning (Heino
2017, 7). Three key manifestations of such position are the following:
1) Authoritarian populist parties “represent ‘the people’, rather than ideas” and
capitalize and relay on the antagonized elite vs. the people dichotomy.
2) “Authoritarian populism lacks interest in and even patience with constitutional
rule of law . . . hence, populists prefer fewer speed bumps in the democratic process
in order for temporary majorities to legislate and enforce new laws.”
3) Authoritarian populist agenda is focused on “the quest for a more powerful state.”
(Heino 2017, 8-9)
The three manifestations directly represent the values/political agenda, as well as, the
implemented initiatives of Law and Justice, highlighting its ample fit in the authoritarian
populist analytical category. It should be stressed that the anti-elite position is not limited
to a populist rhetoric. Yet, denoting politics as corrupting is a defining feature of populism
in general (Taggart 2012).
The categorization lines between authoritarian populist and radical/extreme left-wing
(e.g., “Stalinism, Trotskyism, Maoism, Leninism”) or right-wing (e.g., “fascism, neonazism”) populist parties that emerged after World War II are challenging to discern (Heino
2017, 7). Piero Ignazi, an Italian political scientist, posits that an extreme right-wing
populist party is only classified as such when “its electorate position[s] itself at the extreme
Right of the political spectrum (relative to other parties) and this must be combined with an
ideology based or reliant on fascist values and ideas and/or one which positions itself as
alternative and in opposition to the democratic system” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 4).
The labeling of party’s ideological standing and its degree of extremeness becomes even
more problematic since voters supportive of populist parties typically do not position
themselves on the extreme Right (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 4). The key-identifying
feature of radical/extreme right-wing or left-wing populist parties is their anti-liberal and
anti-democratic position (Heino 2017, 7). In the past this has been the stand of communist
and fascist rulers; and, in the modern-day, the Hungarian Jobbik party serves as a primary
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example (Heino 2017, 7). Given the theory highlighted above, it appears that the proper
label for the Polish PiS party is that of an authoritarian populist rather than a
radical/extreme right-wing populist. Despite the party’s anti-democratic reforms (e.g., a
law which prohibited media to be present during parliamentary meetings; Constitutional
Tribunal scandal, which undermines independence of judiciary branch), PiS does not
directly/sufficiently rely on fascist values, which is Ignazi’s necessary condition for an
extreme right-wing program.
IV.

Relevance Today: The Interconnectedness of the Declining State of Global
Democracy and the Success of Right-Wing Populism in Europe
The political regime of one’s society infiltrates the public and private life of citizens

on a daily basis, as it shapes the national culture, collective memories, and historical
narratives of a nation state. The public debate on which type of government is the most
effective, as well as, the most successful in positioning citizens as active political actors,
continues to be of crucial significance in modern times, while having its roots in the ancient
world, particularly in Athens. With the recent emergence of new forms of political
strategies, which use digitization and technology to alter democratic processes and voter
behavior, along with the changing global political landscape/climate—the debate has
become more complex with the addition of unchartered variables. Throughout history,
populist movements, particularly in Europe and Latin America, have been widely regarded
as legitimate threats to the democratic tradition, yet remarkably, as Canovan notes, “New
Populists explicitly claim to be true democrats, setting out to reclaim power for the people”
(Canovon 2004, 242). This perspective is in line with that of Jan-Werner Müller—a modern
expert on populism, whose work has recently gained significant traction in the American
media—who argues “at populism's core is a rejection of pluralism as populists will always
claim that they and they alone represent the people and their true interests” (Müller).
However, opposing popular opinions view populist political programs as attempts to hijack
(true) democratic principals, thus attacking democracy itself.
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Democracy, arguably the government system preferred by the majority of nation
states, as evidenced by “more people today liv[ing] in electoral democracies than ever
before,” is facing challenges of decline/reversal and stagnation on a global scale (Institute of
Democracy and Electoral Assistance). The combination of social, economic, and foreign
policy issues related to “corruption, money in politics and policy capture, inequality and
social exclusion, migration or post-conflict transition to democracy” has resulted in
ideological tensions and heightened pressures on the democratic system (International IDEA
2017). One of the leading democracy scholars, Larry Diamond, points out that the world
has been experiencing a “democracy recession” since 2006. During the time period
between 2006 and 2018, out of all nation states, 113 countries have witnessed a net
decline, and only 62 have seen a net improvement in the assessment of the holistic
democratic standing (Freedom House 2018). Although, “anti-democratic parties are still
marginalized,” such programs have recorded minor gains in 2017 (Heino 2017, 3).
The “democracy recession” is generally manifested by a decline in trust in institutions
and public participation in democratic processes (i.e., voting), less effective government
rule, rise in the popularity of radical political actors and a decline in the support for
“mainstream representative parties,” media freedoms/civil liberties, along with a growing
social divide between the political elites and voters (The Economist Democracy Survey).
These trends are supported by multiple leading democracy assessment methods such as the
Freedom House Index and The Economist Democracy Survey. Considerably, “political rights
and civil liberties around the world deteriorated to their lowest point in more than a decade
in 2017, extending a period characterized by emboldened autocrats, beleaguered
democracies, and the United States’ withdrawal from its leadership role in the global
struggle for human freedom” (Freedom House 2018). Notably, on a scale of 0 being least
free and 100 being most free, Poland’s aggregate score of (citizens’) freedom in 2017 was
recorded at 85, relatively at par with the United States, which scored 86 (Freedom House
2018).
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The themes of retreat from democracy and democratic stagnation are closely
interconnected with the rise of populism, yet the relationship between the two appears to be
complex in nature (Freedom House 2018). Voters’ economic and social anxieties, sparked
due to the manifestations of a declining Democratic Tradition pointed out by Larry Diamond,
have successfully “fueled the rise of [right-wing] populist leaders who appeal to antiimmigrant sentiment and give short shrift to fundamental civil and political liberties”
(Freedom House 2018). In Europe, this proposition was embodied in Poland’s 2015
elections, and more recently in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria during the
2017 election period—as “reverberations from the 2015–16 refugee crisis continued to fuel
the rise of xenophobic, far-right parties” (Freedom House 2018).
Based on election data, populism is gaining momentum in the current state of
European affairs. This sentiment is evidenced by the following key trends and themes
exposed by the voter behavior. According to the data of the TIMBRO Authoritarian Populism
index[5], which follows European authoritarian/anti-establishment

[6]

(across the Left-Right

political spectrum) populist parties since 1980—in 2017 “every third European government
consist[ed] of or depend[ed] on an authoritarian populist party, and . . . populist parties on
average attract[ed] approximately twenty percent of European voters [, which totaled to
55.8 million voters]” (Heino 2017). The voter support for modern European populist parties
is “higher than ever before” and has steadily increased since 1980. More specifically, during
the time period between 1980 and 2000, the vote share of anti-establishment parties
increased only one percent (from 10.1 percent to 11.3 percent), while the more meaningful
jump in the success/popularity occurred in 2016 and 2017 achieving a voter share of 18.4
percent (Heino 2017). On the EU15 scale, the trend of increasing voter support is
demonstrated in Figure 4, which displays the total anti-establishment/ authoritarian vote
[5]

The 2017 TIMBRO Authoritarian Populism Index “is the only Europe-wide comprehensive study that aims to shed
light on whether populism poses a long-term threat to European ‘liberal’ democracies. The Index explores the rise
of authoritarian populism in Europe by analysing electoral data from 1980 to summer 2017” (Heino 2017).
[6]
In the TIMBRO report, “authoritarian populism is used as a collective word for the parties that challenge the socalled European consensus that has dominated the continent’s politics since the end of World War II” (Heino 2017).
This is in line with Hall’s definition of authoritarian populism (p. 21).
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share in the 15 EU countries[7] who became member states prior to the accession of the ten
candidate countries on May of 2004 (OECD).
Figure 4: Anti-Establishment Vote Share In EU15

Source: EPiCenter/Timbro 2017 Report

One of the key findings of the TIMBRO index analysis states that “authoritarian
populism has established itself as the third ideological tide in European politics, next to
Conservatism/Christian Democracy and Social Democracy [, while surpassing Liberalism]”
(Heino 2017, 4). This highlights an important change in the voters’ ideological preferences,
which are drifting away from the conservative/Christian-democratic outlook and moving
towards the more extreme right-wing/left-wing party position. It is important to mention
populism “always fuses with other ideologies [e.g., Conservatism, Social Democracy]
[which] means that there is no such thing as ‘pure’ populism (Taggart 2012, 1). Based on
the data, interestingly, the popularity of Liberalism[8] has remained the same, when

[7]

The EU15 “comprised the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom” (OECD).
[8]
In this chapter, “Liberalism” refers to the liberal tradition (i.e., “political doctrine that takes protecting and
enhancing the freedom of the individual to be the central problem of politics”), as opposed to “liberal” descriptor of
a political “anti-interventionist” ideological leaning (Britannica).
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compared Europe in 1997 and 2017. Figure 5 demonstrates a comprehensive comparison
of the European voters’ preferences by party ideology in 1997 and 2017.
Figure 5: Voter Preferences By Party Ideology In Europe

Source: EPiCenter/Timbro 2017 Report

In terms of political leaning—in Europe—in recent years, both the radical left-wing
and extreme right-wing programs have attracted more voters than usual. Notably, “rightwing populism is twice the size of left-wing populism, but while right-wing populism has
stagnated, left-wing populism has doubled since 2010” (Heino 2017). In terms of
geographic scope—in 2017, the strongest support for the right-wing/authoritarian populists
has been in Hungary, Poland, and Greece; while, the weakest in “Malta, Montenegro,
Luxembourg, and Iceland – interestingly, Europe’s four least populous countries” (Heino
2017).
These themes highlight the relevance of authoritarian populism as a powerful force
of change within the political and social landscape of Europe—especially given its effects
continuously unravel and are projected to do so in the future. The long run trends indicated
by the TIMBRO index reveal, “there are no signs that support for anti-establishment parties
will decrease in the short run” (Heino 2017). Therefore, the complexity of populism shall
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not be dismissed or oversimplified, while studying the present-day European political/social
climate.
In 2016, political scientist Takis S. Pappas, proposed that contemporary populism
may be defined as “democratic non-liberalism”, i.e., populism “recognizes the majority’s
right to make decisions, but excludes liberal constraints on political power” (Heino 2017,
7).

In practice, such rule may be highly problematic since liberal principals of freedom and

equality, along with the constraints on governing institutions and officials, which provide
discipline for controlling the scope of power—disappear (Starr 2007, 15). Dating back to
the late seventeenth century, this discipline of power, which protects citizens from tyranny,
has been only successfully granted by Constitutional Liberalism and not any other system
(Starr 2007, 15). Thus, it may be speculated that contemporary populism is a more
significant long-term threat to Liberalism rather than democracy itself. This is evidenced by
political scientists, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, who denote that populism,
“can [in fact] be both a corrective and a threat to democracy” and is based on two criteria
points: 1) “the degree of democratic consolidation” and 2) “whether populists sit in
opposition or in government” (2012:16). Moreover,
“In consolidated democracies, [defined as “a political regime in which free and fair
elections are institutionalized as the mechanism whereby access to political power is
determined”], populism in opposition is expected to have small positive impact on
the quality of democracy, whereas populism in government should have a moderate
effect on democracy, either positive or negative. In unconsolidated democracies, on
the other hand, populism in government is expected to have strong negative effects
on democracy while populism in opposition should serve as a corrective to
democracy.”
(Gidron and Bonikowski 2013, 21)
Perhaps, if populism spreads to more areas of the world in the years to come, then
democratic processes will be reshaped or at worst reduced in use—as an externality of
steering away from the liberal guards that keep the balance and discipline of power
protected from the abuses by political actors.
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Chapter III
Socio-Economic Forces That Sparked the Emergence of a Right-Wing
Populist Program In Poland

Poland’s most recent presidential and parliamentary elections took place in October
of 2015. It was then, when the incumbent, the Civic Platform (abbreviated to “PO”), a
liberal-conservative party with pro-European, pro-market vision—lost the elections to a
populist/authoritarian-leaning program. Despite a strong domestic economic situation and
the incumbents’ predictable policymaking, which regularly emphasized deliverables on
European integration and economic development—the Law and Justice party (abbreviated to
“PiS”), a right-wing, national-conservative party, rose to power (Cienski 2015). To better
understand the circumstances, which allowed for this political and social phenomenon to
occur, it is useful to familiarize oneself with a snapshot of Poland’s modern political history,
as well as, with selected socio-economic conditions, which based on precedent have
contributed to the successful mobilization of populist movements. The background
information and analysis included in the subsections of this chapter is guided by the
research question and directly relates to the explanations of modern populism seen in
literature, as well as, to the findings of the survey conducted by the author in Poland. The
purpose of this chapter is to understand the Polish civil society in 2015 and in the years
leading up to the elections, alongside with the key political and socio-economic forces that
have fostered a suitable environment for a right-wing populist program to emerge and
thrive in.
I.

Historical Abstract: Poland’s Road to Democratic Political Structure
Poland’s roots are traced back to over 1000 years ago, yet the country’s democratic

regime is relatively young. The Republic of Poland’s first pivotal economic and political
transformation in modern history occurred in 1989, as a result of the Round Table
Agreement of 1989. After 44 years of Soviet-led communist control, a newly formed
29

parliamentary democratic government, which encouraged free-market practices of marketbased competition and privatization, was enforced. The labor-union movements, most
notably the Solidarnosc reform movement led by Lech Walesa, and the leadership of the
Polish Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II, the first Polish Pontiff—were the two leading
forces that successfully energized Poland’s defeat of the communist rule and the formation
of a parliamentary republic (Segel 2012). The radical economic “shock-therapy,”
spearheaded by the newly established democratic government, aimed to “stabilize the
macroeconomy and to create the conditions necessary for privatization, enterprise
restructuring, and the development of an institutional system compatible with a market
economy” (Johnson and Loveman 1995). These extensive efforts allowed for the country’s
relatively quick rise to post-communist economic, political, and social stability. Poland’s
model of post-communist transformation has served as an unrivalled example to follow for
other countries recovering from Soviet-led control (Johnson and Loveman 1995).
Poland’s present-day political system is a parliamentary democracy ruled by law and
guided by the Constitution created in April 1997, which grants and protects individual
freedoms (e.g., freedom of religion, philosophy, media, etc.), a social market economy, and
a separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers (President.pl). The legislative
power is divided between two chambers of parliament—Sejm (lower house) and Senat
(upper chamber). The 460 members of Sejm are elected by proportional representation,
while the 100 Senat representatives are selected using the one-round first-past-the-post
voting method. Parliamentary elections occur every four years (President.pl). The
President—elected every five years by the popular vote method—holds the role of head of
state and nominates the Prime Minister (Head of Government). The PM leads the Council of
Ministers, a group responsible for “government decision-making and implementation of
government policies; the Cabinet is answerable to the Sejm” (Misachi 2017).
II.

Dominant Political Parties in Poland: Civic Platform and Law and Justice
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A. Civic Platform (PO)
Despite a vast array of political parties in Poland and the multi-party framework of
the political structure, which generally leads to coalitions—currently two actors are
considered to be significantly popular among voters and powerful agents in the civic and
political realm. The Civic Platform, a centrist Christian-Democratic political party, led by
Donald Tusk[9], rose to power with its parliamentary election win in 2007 and formed a
coalition with the Peasant Party (PSL), despite the divisions between the two parties on the
policy front. PO’s then value proposition strategically positioned the program in a way that
portrayed them in the eyes of the voters as the new, modern, centrist, “catch-all” party,
which opposed both the ruling left (SLD party) and the right (PiS) ideologies. Civic
Platform’s target electorate was educated, urban voters eager to benefit from Poland’s
induction into the EU and investment/employment opportunities arisen from foreign capital.
In 2011, the party was reelected for its second term in the parliament. Notably, it
was the first political party in Poland’s democratic history to be reelected, making Donald
Tusk the longest serving Prime Minister in the Polish history (Sobczak and Krajewski 2014).
Figure 6 demonstrates PO’s voter share gained during parliamentary elections since the
party’s founding in 2001. The Civic Platform reached a plateau of growth in 2011. Notably,
during the 2015 election cycle, the party witnessed a sharp decline of 15.1 percent in the
voter share, as compared to the 2011 election results.
Figure 6: Civic Platform’s Vote Share During Parliamentary Elections
Vote Share

Percentage Change

(% Of Total Votes)

From Last Election

2001

12.7

+ 12.7

2005

24.1

+ 11.4

2007

41.5

+ 17.4

2011

39.2

- 2.3

2015

24.1

- 15.1

Year of Election

Data Source: Parl Gov Database

[9]

Since December of 2014, Donald Tusk, holds the position of President of the European Council. He was
reelected for second term on March 9, 2017.
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In terms of presidential races—the party had only one successful candidate.
Notably, Donald Tusk, the party’s long-time leader until his post in the European Council,
was unsuccessful in the 2005 attempt, and lost to the PiS candidate. In 2010, a Polish Air
Force crashed in Smolensk, Russia, killing President Lech Kaczynski (PiS) and 95
government officials, who were en route to the 70th anniversary of the Katyn Massacre,
which took place during World War II (Easton 2016). Following the national tragedy, the
Civic Platform won the presidential race, making Bronislaw Komorowski Head of State.
Multiple political scandals and internal divisions of the then incumbent party, PiS, set a
strategically positive stage for PO’s agenda of social and governmental reform. The Civic
Platform also experienced internal unethical behavior, which tainted its reputation and
decreased its political capital. For example, in 2013 embarrassing audiotapes of senior
government officials (i.e., the Central Bank Governor and the Interior Minister) discussing
“the removal of another minister and ways to put pressure on a private businessman” were
leaked to the public (Sobczak and Krajewski 2014). This resulted in political turmoil in the
party headquarters and the parliament. “The system of institutions tasked with combating
corruption in Poland is well developed and efficient but its successes are often
overshadowed by major political scandals that contribute to a damaging stereotype of
“everybody steals” among the general public (Freedom House 2018).
Since the party’s founding, PO’s political agenda has been economically pro-liberal
and heavily focused on pro-European Union relations and pro-market reforms, aimed to
stimulate the steadily expanding domestic economy and to boost Poles’ sense of belonging
in the EU. In the past, PO’s economic initiatives, although were strategically beneficial for
the Polish economic growth outlook, oftentimes proved unpopular with the public, as some
tax exemptions were terminated. The party’s program has been historically supportive of
greater integration and solidarity within Polish society, as witnessed though the party’s use
of unifying rather than dichotomy-creating political discursive strategies. On the social
front, when compared to American standards, PO holds relatively conservative views—in
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line with Poland’s demographics and cultural inclinations towards traditional Catholic values.
Yet, in comparison to PiS’, the Civic Platform’s social agenda is more liberal on ethical issues
such as abortion, same-sex marriage, and in vitro fertility treatments. To those in favor of
the 2015 populist program, the liberal agenda represented a threat to Polish national
interests—empowering the foreign economic dominance of Poland and undermining the
values of a nuclear Catholic family (Smith 2015). The loss of PO’s long-time leader, whose
charisma was often cited in the popular media, only added to the party’s troubles to
maintain its power in the government.
When Donald Tusk resigned in September 2014 to pursue the position of President of
the European Council—internal party power-struggles/disagreements occurred and were
widely publicized. In January 2016, when Grzegorz Schetyna won the appointment of party
leader, PO “faced a major, possibly even existential, crisis” (Szczerbiak 2017). This
environment set stage for PiS to successfully promote its new Presidential candidate as the
uncorrupted-by-the-political-environment face, when Civic Platform underwent transitional
conflicts and put significantly less efforts and focus into the reelection campaign (both
presidential and parliamentary). Post 2015 elections, many political analysts cited PO’s
elite-like disillusionment with the state of the everyday affairs of Polish citizens, their
dangerous underestimation of PiS’ power to attract the masses with enticing social welfare
benefits, and Schetyna’s weak/relatively uncharismatic leadership—as some of the key
campaign-related reasons for the party’s loss of power and momentum.
Polish society is “extremely sensitive to nepotism and abuses of power by political
elites [and] politicians are also under high media scrutiny” (Freedom House). PO’s
campaign, characterized by the lack of new policy ideas, also seemed less credible to its
primary voter base of liberals, when a new liberal party focused on free-market deliverables
emerged in the 2015 election race. The Modern party (“Nowoczesna”), led by a private
sector economist, Ryszard Petru, secured 7.6 percent of the 2015 parliamentary election
voter share, and as a consequence, took away support from PO’s program (Szczerbiak
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2017). “Without the political ballast of having to defend eight years in office, Mr Petru’s
criticisms of the Law and Justice government appeared more authentic and credible [than
those of PO]” (Szczerbiak 2017). The fragmentation of PO’s voter base, consisting of
individuals opposing PiS, resulted in unprecedented changes to Poland’s balance of power.
B. Law and Justice (PiS)
Law and Justice, led by the brothers Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, is a right-wing,
national-conservative, Christian-Democratic party founded in 2001. The party’s agenda
includes a multitude of social welfare benefits, strong Eurosceptic sentiment, and an attitude
of “making Poland great again” that often relies on conspiracy theories (i.e., the Smolensk
catastrophe was set up/executed by the Civic Platform party, etc.) (Traub 2016). Flagship
PiS policy positions include a strict ban on abortions, in-vitro fertilization, and same-sex
marriage, the necessity of strong NATO to combat Russian threats, increased taxes on the
financial sector/banks, and the closing of borders to most refugees and asylum seekers,
particularly from Syria. PiS has a long-time (unofficial) strategic alliance with the Polish
Catholic Church and its religious media, which continue to provide an unchallenged platform
for popularizing its program and false historical narratives. The analysis and summary of
PiS’ populist political strategies seen in 2015 may be found in chapter VI.
Prior to 2015, the party ruled in parliamentary coalition with the League of Polish
Families and the Self-Defense populist parties from 2005-2007 (Reuters). President Lech
Kaczynski, then PiS leader, held power from 2005 to until his death in the Smolensk plane
crash in 2010 (Reuters). In the popular media, the opposing parties frequently labeled his
term as the “anti-reformist years” tainted with political scandals. Given that in Poland the
President does not hold significant power in comparison to the Prime Minister and the
legislative branch, the opposition argues that prior to 2015 PiS only held meaningful power
during its two years in the coalition.
The party’s 2015 dichotomy-creating/stratifying campaign rhetoric relied on “an
agenda to strengthen unilateral government power and reduce economic freedom” and on
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conservative Catholic values intertwined with patriotic sentiment, which strongly resonated
with voters (e.g., rural voters, voters with lower levels of education) who felt excluded out
of the incumbent’s pro-market vision (Misachi 2017). Therefore, the party is “most popular
among working class, rural, and church-going voters in eastern Poland [who are drawn to
PiS’ view that] rural Poland needs help from central government” (Rettman 2015). The
Polish political landscape was transformed, when PiS won the presidential and parliamentary
elections. The sharp rise in grassroots movements and public protests best highlights this
development (Berezow 2017).
III.

Analysis of the Puzzling Polish Presidential and Parliamentary Elections of 2015
The most recent Polish presidential election took place in October of 2015 and the

winner was announced after two rounds of voting. In the second round, the Law and
Justice candidate, Andrzej Duda, won the 2015 presidential election with 51.5 percent of the
votes (8,630,627 votes), while the Civic Platform incumbent, President Komorowski lost
with 48.5 percent of the voter share (8,112,311 votes) (Reuters). The overall turnout in
the first round amounted to 48.96 percent of total registered voters, while 55.34 percent
was recorded in the final round (National Electoral Office). Figure 7 provides the
comprehensive results of the presidential election. Remarkably, this was the closest
presidential election in Polish history.
Figure 7: Poland’s 2015 Presidential Election Comprehensive Results

Candidate

Party Affiliation

First Round
Votes

First Round
Voter Share
(%)

Second Round
Votes

Second Round
Vote Share
(%)

Andrzej Duda

Law and Justice

5,179,092

34.76

8,630,627

51.55

Bronisław Komorowski

Independent

5,031,060

33.77

8,112,311

48.45

Paweł Kukiz

Independent

3,099,079

20.8

-

-

Janusz
Korwin-Mikke

KORWiN

486,084

3.26

-

-

Magdalena Ogórek

Independent

353,883

2.38

-

-

Adam Jarubas

Polish People's Party

238,761

1.6

-

-

Janusz Palikot

Your Movement

211,242

1.42

-

-

Grzegorz Braun

Independent

124,132

0.83

-

-
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Marian Kowalski

National Movement

77,630

0.52

-

-

Jacek Wilk

Congress of the New
Right

68,186

0.46

-

-

Paweł Tanajno

Direct Democracy

29,785

0.2

-

-

Data Source: National Electoral Office

Notably, Duda won 62 percent of the votes in the countryside communities and lost
the vote of the “cities with more than 500 thousand residents” with 41.1 percent (WP
2015). The incumbent narrowly won the vote of “cities with less than 50 thousand
residents” and “cities with more than 50 thousand residents” categories (WP 2015). Figure
8 illustrates the East vs. West split between the two presidential candidates. The Eastern
region has been historically economically disadvantaged as compared to the Western parts
of the country. Throughout Polish history, analysts continue to notice the geographical
divide on the basis of voting along the boundary between the Prussian (western region of
Poland today) and Russian (eastern region of Poland today) territories.
Figure 8: Map of 2015 Presidential Election Results in Poland

%

%

Source: Gazeta Wyborcza (Election Night Results)

The political landscape on the local level significantly changed as “one of the EU’s
longest-serving governments,” was ended (Cienski 2015). In the 2015 parliamentary
election, the PiS party won with 37.58 percent of the votes (235 seats out of 460, granting
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first in 25 years absolute majority/single-party government), while the Civic Platform party
gained 24.09 percent of the voter share (138 seats) (Reuters). The valid voter turnout
amounted to 50.92 percent of total population registered to vote (Consulate General of
Republic of Poland in New York). Figure 9 displays the comprehensive list of results.
Figure 9: Poland’s 2015 Parliamentary Election Comprehensive Results
Party

Seat Share
(%)

Seats

Vote share

Votes

Law and Justice

51.1

235

37.6

5,711,687

Civic Platform

30

138

24.1

3,661,474

Kukiz'15

9.1

42

8.8

1,339,094

Modern

6.1

28

7.6

1,155,370

Polish People's Party

3.5

16

5.1

779,875

German Minority

0.2

1

0.2

27,530

Poland Together

-

-

-

-

United Poland

-

-

-

-

Democratic Left Alliance

-

0

7.6

1,147,102

Your Movement

-

-

-

-

Data Source: ParlGov

Out of the total voter share, PiS held “46.8 percent of the votes among inhabitants of rural
areas [the Civic Platform held 17.3 percent of the votes], 36 percent among inhabitants of
small towns, as well as 52.3 percent among farmers and 45.4 percent among workers”
(Wojtasik 2016). Additionally, Law and Justice won the higher education vote with 30.4
percent (PO held 26.7 percent), and the adolescents/students vote with 23.9 percent, while
PO only managed to acquire 13.2 percent (WP).
The growth of PiS’ popularity is best demonstrated with the comparison of 2011 and
2015 parliamentary election results. Figure 10, graphically portrays the monumental
growth in PiS’ voter base in the four year time period. Notably, the party succeeded in
capturing regions (e.g., central Poland) that were historically supportive of the Civic
Platform.
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Figure 10: Comparison of 2011 vs. 2015 Parliamentary Election
2011 Parliamentary Election

2015 Parliamentary Election

Source: Bloomberg/Polish Election Commission

IV.

Economic Development: Poland’s Impressive Growth, Complicated Distribution
The success of the Polish post-communist reconstruction enabled the country to join

the European Union in 2004, in hopes of advancing its economic growth engine and
international status towards the levels of Western neighbors, such as Germany. Following
1989, the year the democratic system began, “for more than two decades the average
economic growth [in Poland] reached 4% a year, faster than other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe [and] per capita income increased from 29% of its German equivalent in
1992 to 55% in 2014 [, significantly narrowing the gap between the living standards in
Poland and Western Europe]” (Tatala 2016, 44). The economic growth predominantly
resulted from heightened inflows of funds from the European Union in effort to rebuild
Poland’s infrastructure, a stable domestic banking system, and increased
employment/productivity levels (Tatala 2016, 44-47). Additionally, low labor costs and
highly skilled labor market participants became Poland’s sources of competitive advantage,
which resulted in attracting a host of international investors/capital (particularly in the
manufacturing space) and consequently boosting the country’s economic standing and risk
profile in the global markets (Tatala 2016).
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It is noteworthy that after the Great Recession of 2008, Poland held the title of the
“Green Island,” indicating that the Republic was the only European country that escaped a
technical recession (i.e., two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth) and experienced
GDP growth during 2008 and 2009. This success may be attributed to prudent fiscal
policymaking prior to the crisis, moderate stimulus package response, floating domestic
exchange rate, and the country’s dynamic economic growth and relatively stable political
environment prior to 2008 (Drozdowicz-Biec 2011, 40)[10]. In 2015, the year of elections,
Poland was relatively economically stable—“its real GDP growth has been among the highest
in Europe; it [had] no inflation, single-digit unemployment, declining inequality (at a level
about average for European countries) and healthy public finances with a budget deficit
below 3 percent of GDP” (Tworzecki and Markowski 2015). The party that held power prior
to and during the crisis was the fiscally prudent Civic Platform party. Notably, despite the
consistent economic growth between 2012 and 2015 and a stable labor market environment
with declining annual unemployment rate, as highlighted by Figures 11 and 12—the
incumbent political party lost the 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections, suggesting
that the explanatory power of successful modern right-wing populist programs must reach
beyond pocket voting (i.e., economic voting) and monetary-based analysis of elections.
Figure 11: Poland’s Gross Domestic Product (% Annual)

GDP Growth
(% Annual)
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Note: GDP growth rate is rounded to the nearest hundredth decimal.

Data Source: World Bank

[10]

The statement is based on the findings of my class-related research paper: “The Green Island: The Republic of
Poland’s Fiscal Response to the Great Recession of 2008.” The “(Drozdowicz-Biec 2011)” source was one of
multiple resources used in the writing process.
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Unemployment
(Annual Averge)

Figure 12: Poland’s Unemployment Rate (% Annual Average)
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Although, the two key indicators suggest a stable economic environment, it appears
some groups of voters still felt financially disempowered and/or alienated. High emigration
numbers highlight this dissatisfaction. It is estimated that “at least 2.5 million Poles left the
country over the past decade, 6 percent of a population of 39 million, [most of whom
moved to the United Kingdom and Germany]” (Moskwa and Jefferson 2016). Such trends
were also highlighted in the conducted survey. Five out of 40 participants, chose to
emigrate in an effort to receive better salaries oversees (e.g., in Iceland, Great Britain, and
the United States). Increased emigration underscores the voter-perceptive societal division
of those who benefit from the EU accession and those who are unaffected or negatively
affected by it. This is also highlighted in the sharp rise of workers who are employed in
ways (e.g., temporary contracts) that are associated with high risk of job loss and
instability, along with poverty (Arak et. al 2014).
The five emigrants who were interviewed mentioned the need to remain in the EU
with the purpose of keeping the borders open for dislocated job seekers. In terms of 2015
institutional and social priorities, Poles cited “unemployment” as the most important issue
that Poland was facing, following a tie between “health and social security” and “pensions.”
“Rising price/inflation/cost of living” were cited as the most important issue Polish
respondents themselves were facing (Eurobarometer 2015 Report). Figure 13 reports the
related comprehensive list of findings. Based on the 2015 election results, it appears that
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these trends of economic anxiety and somewhat dissatisfaction experienced by the voters
translated as support for a program that championed social welfare benefits instead of
fostering pro-business conditions.
Figure 13: Social/Economic Issues Poland and

Source: 2015 Eurobarometer PL

In 2015, Poland had a government budget deficit equal to 2.60 percent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), while 3.60 percent was recorded in 2014 (Trading Economics).
During the time period between 1995 and 2016, the country’s government budget averaged
- 4.20 percent of GDP (Trading Economics). In terms of expenditures, as a consequence of
significant increase in social welfare initiatives/programs, government spending greatly
heightened post 2015 elections—reaching an all time high of PLN 102359.50 million in Q4 of
2016 (Trading Economics). On average, government spending amounted to PLN 53355.53
million during the time period from 1996 until 2017 (Trading Economics). PiS’ agenda of
increased social welfare programs, particularly its controversial “flagship” PLN 500 plan,
which provides all families (irrespective of income) with monthly child benefits of PLN 500
(approx. $125) for every second and subsequent child; as well as, doubling of tax-exempt
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share of household income—adds an estimated $11 billion to the 2018 government budget
(Miszerak and Rohac 2016). Given the country’s still somewhat developing economy and
the young age of the Polish democratic regime, expenditures of such magnitude may not be
sustainable in the long run. In fact, negative economic effects are already starting to be
visible. Following the 2015 elections, Poland experienced GDP growth of only 2.8 percent,
marking it the weakest GDP growth in three years (Bouzanis 2017). The full description and
analysis of the consequences of PiS’ rule may be found in the last chapter of the thesis.
The additional social welfare benefits presented by PiS’ agenda appealed to the
dislocated rural voters, as well as, to those who shared the intensifying feelings of economic
frustration—thus, who naturally valued and considered the short-term individual benefits
more than budget-straining long-term economic performance of the country (Ádám and
Bozóki 2015, 4). Importantly, it appears that the explanation behind the success of populist
movements, including the Polish case, is more complex than the state of the economy and
citizens’ monetary well being alone—suggesting that cultural and case-specific analysis is
recommended. It appears that in 2015 social narratives, comprising of religious influences
and rural experiences, and the incumbent party’s ignorance of them in their reelection
campaign, also played a pivotal role in the voter behavior.
V.

Social Context: Poland, A Culturally Homogenous Civil Society

[11]

The Polish society, which had a population of 37,986,412 individuals in 2015

, is

[12]

relatively homogenous in terms of religion, race, and ethnicity (World Bank). On precedent,
these factors affected and continue to affect the political climate and policymaking today.
On average 96.7 percent of Poland's population is comprised of ethnic Poles, indicating
minimal diversity and immigrant inflow (CIA). The scarcity of diverse groups, may partially
explain the historical lack of strong support for liberal political agendas (particularly on
social issues), the citizens’ intensifying fear of “the other,” which in recent years has been
[11]

This sub-section, as well as the 2015 elections section (p. 35) include some direct content from the author’s
class-related research paper: “The Rise of Populism in Poland: How the Power of Religious Media Influenced the
Rural Vote.”
[12]
Poland is the EU’s “sixth most-populous country” (Miszerak and Rohac 2016).
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refugees, as well as, the hyper-nationalist sentiment seen within PiS’ voter base.
Another “unifying” cultural element—and important in the processes of policymaking
and agenda setting—in Poland’s homogenous society is religion. Today, the majority of
Poles (87.20 percent) identifies with Roman Catholicism, which continues to play a critical
role in most aspects of the private and public life (CIA). Not only active participation in
religious observances and weekly mass attendance is deeply embedded into the Polish
culture, but religious institutions are also generally perceived as a source of moral
leadership, which shapes a Pole’s identity at the individual and collective level. “The issues
particularly concerned with the family and reproduction law (divorce, abortions, etc.) are
under high observation of the Church in Poland both on the level of nation-state as well as
in the local communities” (Buzalka 2005, 12). Remarkably, despite a constitutional
separation of church and state, the Catholic Church uses its traditionally privileged position
to provide endorsement of political candidates through its affiliated media platforms.
Historically, the influence of the Catholic Church has been exceptionally significant
across Polish rural communities. This is emphasized by a quote from a small-village mayor:
“the ethos of the people who live [in Polish villages] is work and faith” (Lyman 2016). This
spirit can be seen all throughout Poland’s rural regions, which make up 39.46 percent of the
total population—a percentage steadily rising since 2002 (CIA). The most influential and
popular media outlets, above all in the rural communities, are Radio Maryja, TV I Persist,
and “Our Daily” newspaper—all “formally run by the Order of Holy Redeemer and managed
by the hand of its Director, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk [who] understands the importance of the
‘fourth power’ in a democratic society” (Burdziej 2008, 208). Radio Maryja is Poland’s fifth
most popular radio station and the newspaper sells daily an estimated 250,000 copies and
has a devoted following, energized mainly by the elderly and rural residents (Burdziej 2008,
208). The political involvement of these religious media platforms began at their origin in
1991, only three years after the fall of communism in Poland. Continually, journalists and
TV/radio personalities “unequivocally supported Kaczynski [the leader of the populist party],
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both before and after the [2005] elections, while simultaneously denigrating Tusk (...) and
called PO [the Civic Platform] a ‘masonic conspiracy of wolves,’ i.e., of Western corporations
and post communist elites” (Burdziej 2008, 211). The promotion of PiS, using conspiracybased criticisms of the denounced frequently as “heathen and anti-Polish” Civic Platform,
prospered amid the 2015 elections.
During programs of the mentioned media outlets, leaders of the populist party, were
“given ample time to talk about government plans and proceedings, uninterrupted by those
leading the programs” (Burdziej 2008, 211). These propaganda-like discussions,
empowered with religious approval, display an unquestioned source of legitimacy for the
populist candidate in the eyes of the voters. However, the outlets had its critics in Poland
and beyond. In 2006, the Vatican officially reprimanded the religious media but no
fundamental changes were implemented. Importantly, some members of the Polish clergy
criticize this interventionist phenomenon, yet there is no unanimity between the bishops—
“roughly half . . . are perceived as supportive of the Radio [Maryja, making it difficult to
rectify the platforms]” (Burdziej 2008, 214). The aim of the rough majority of the
institutional Church (i.e., the clergy) is to influence the civil society, rather than the political
one, yet due to the lack of unanimity, the Catholic Church has not cut its ties with Father
Rydzyk’s media (Burdziej 2008, 219).
Another social development, which has been sharply intensifying since the 2015
election campaigns began, is the unprecedented hyper-polarization on the grounds of
political ideologies and preferences (Llana 2016). This is impacting social relationships and
threatening the cohesion of the Polish social order. Based on my field study, it can be
inferred that the ideological divide between social groups and even family members has
increased distrust of the opposing political camp and heightened citizens’ inclination towards
conspiracy theories/alternative realities created by media propaganda. Four out of 40
survey participants conduced, mentioned conflicting opinions on political and social fronts
exist within their families, while speaking somewhat derogatively of the party they oppose.
44

Koszykowska

45

Chapter IV
Field Study: Small-Scale Public Survey in Poland (2018)

I conducted a small-scale public survey in an effort to gauge the voter sentiment
toward PO and PiS in Eastern Poland. The region has been historically supportive of the Law
and Justice party. Correspondingly, in the 2015 presidential election, PiS gained 41.80
percent of all Bialystok votes, while the Civic Platform vote share was recorded at 25.78
percent (WP). During the field study, participants were asked multiple-choice questions,
followed with open-ended interview inquiries directly related to key social/economic/political
factors covered in the thesis. The majority of questions were designed as open-ended to
ensure an unclosed discussion without designated topic silos. The questionnaire used is
found in the appendix, on page 109. Figure 14 provides a summarized view of the details
related to the field study and its comprehensive results.
Figure 14: Description and Results of the Field Study
Field Study Description
Date Conducted

1/15/18 and 1/16/18
Shopping Mall ("Galeria Jurowiecka")
Bialystok, Poland

Location
Sample Size

40

Sample Selection Method

Random
(Based on shoppers' availability)

Average Duration of Interview

8-14 minutes

Percentage of Total
Interviewed

Age Range
18-25 years old

17

42.5%

26-35 years old

4

10.0%

36-55 years old

8

20.0%

11

27.5%

56+ years old

Percentage of Total
Interviewed

Interviewee’s Place of Residence
Bialystok resident
Not a Bialystok resident

36

90.0%

4

10.0%

56+
years
old
28%

18-25
years
old
42%

36-55
years
old
20%

26-35
years
old
10%

Not a
Bialysto
k
residen
t
10%
Bialystok
resident
90%
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Percentage of Total
Interviewed

Number of Survey Participants
Voted for PiS in 2015 elections

24

60%

Voted for PO in 2015 elections

5

12.5%

Did not vote in 2015 elections

11

27.5%

Satisfaction With Civic Platform’s Rule
From 2007 Until 2015

Did
not
Vote
28%

Somewhat
satisfied

Percentage of Total
Interviewed

12%

“I was somewhat satisfied”

5

12.5%

“I was satisfied.”

9

22.5%

Not
satisfied

26

65.0%

65%

“I was not satisfied.”

Key Reason for Voting for the Presidential Candidate in
2015
7

17.5%

“The candidate’s political agenda on economic
issues resonated with me the most.” [B]

4

10.0%

“I voted for the party (rather than the
candidate) I identify with the most/I’m
affiliated with.” [C]

2

5.0%

27

67.5%

Percentage of Total
Interviewed

Number of Survey Participants
Voted in 2008 Elections

25

62.5%

Did not vote in 2008 Elections

15

37.5%

Change the party participant voted for in 2008
elections [A]
Did not change the party participant voted for in
2008 elections [B]

5

20%

20

80%

Satisfaction With Current Rule of Law and Justice

23%

[A]
17%
[B]
10%
[D]
68%

Percentage of Total
Interviewed

“I am somewhat satisfied”

13

32.5%

“I am satisfied.”

16

40.0%

“I am not satisfied.”

11

27.5%

[C]
5%

Did not
vote in
2008
38%

Voted
in 2008
62%

[A]
20%

Percentage of Total
Participants Who
Voted in 2008

Number of Survey Participants

Satisfied

Percentage of Total
Interviewed

“The candidate’s political agenda on social
issues resonated with me the most.” [A]

“It was a combination of all of the choices
described above.” [D]

PiS
60%

PO
12%

[B]
80%

Not
satisfied

28%

Somewhat
satisfied

32%

Satisfied

40%
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Executive Summary of Key Findings
Based on the responses acquired during the interviews conducted for the field study,
I noticed twelve key trends, which are highlighted in the executive summary below. The
themes (which correspond to the independent variables) of the results have in part guided
my hypothesis for the comparative study and serve as anecdotal evidence throughout the
thesis. Additionally, each of these trends is evaluated in chapters IV and V in context of the
empirical country-level and party-level findings.
1. Concerns About Personal Economic Well-Being: 34 participants expressed that the
most important problem Poland faces today is of economic nature, referring to
unemployment (particularly within the younger population and Eastern regions of the
country), inflation of goods/services, and the lack of raises/stagnation of wages.
Surprisingly, when asked about the overall standing of the Polish economy, the majority of
participants mentioned a “good”/”strong”/”fine” state of the economy.
2. Strong Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric: 35 interviewees stated they do not want more
immigration inflow; many used derogatory language, while referring to Syrian refugees
(e.g., “We don’t need more rapists and thieves—I have kids.”)
3. Economic Motivation to Remain In the EU: 36 participants stated they want Poland
to remain in the EU. Key reasons included: to keep borders open for Polish job seekers, to
keep European employers (thus, job opportunities) within the country.
4. Mixed Positions on Social Issues: 27 participants expressed either a positive or a
neutral (e.g., “This issue doesn’t concern me”) stand on same-sex marriage. Only 12
interviewees (most of whom were in the 18-25 years age range) mentioned a pro-choice
position, and 11 participants refused to express their opinion on the topic.
5. Mixed Views on the Dominance of the Catholic Church: 24 interviewees stated
they wish to see the position of the Catholic Church remain as is, 12 called to decrease its
influence in political affairs. The sentiment about the religious media was highly dependent
on whether the participant was its consumer. Yet, 17 interviewees mentioned they hope to
see the religious media with less influence/involvement.
6. More Social Welfare: 34 participants hoped to see more social welfare benefits and
were in favor of PiS’ PLN500+ policy (i.e., monthly allowance of PLN500 per child for
families with 2+ children).
7. Mixed Views About the Rural vs. Urban Divide: 16 people mentioned that there is a
divide between rural and city/urban residents (due to a combination of economic and
cultural differences). Interestingly, 6 participants mentioned that farm owners today are
wealthier than the majority of town/city residents due to the EU funding received since
2004.
8. Age-Dependent Views on Communism: 22 interviewees mentioned they do not
believe the post-communist sentiment has influence on today’s politics; this comprised
mostly of participants in the youngest age group. 4 participants, who in fact experienced
47

communism themselves, believe life was “better”/“easier” under the communist rule. Many
directly or indirectly expressed an anti-corruption sentiment.
9. Heightened Polarization in (Divided) Poland: 4 participants noted conflicting
opinions on political and social fronts exist within their families, while speaking poorly of
their judgment and somewhat derogatively of the party they opposed.
10. Bright Outlook for Poland, Maybe: 25 participants believe Poland will be “at a
better place” both in 2019 and 2023. The 5 interviewees who voted for PO in 2015 have
expressed a rather gloomy outlook for the nation (in terms of economic health and
international reputation of the nation).
11. Honesty Works Best: The most frequently cited best quality that a politician may
embody is honesty.
12. Importance of Policy Package: Unsurprisingly, 36 interviewees mentioned the
party’s policies as the key-deciding factor when voting. No clear pattern was found beyond
that.
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Chapter V
Empirical Country-Level Analysis

Populist programs are particularly nuanced to analyze given the wide range of
political, social, and cultural environments where such programs galvanize voters in a
politically expedient manner. In fact, finding common denominators within the multitude of
geographies, time periods, and social structural foundations has been deemed challenging
by many researchers and led to “overly broad and insufficiently substantiated
generalizations about populism’s universal features” denoted in literature (Gidron and
Bonikowski 2013, 32). To tackle the challenge of better understanding how and why
populist political actors gain momentum and power, observers of the phenomenon often use
a variety of qualitative or quantitative methodological approaches such as “archival
research, discourse analysis, and formal modeling” (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013, 1). This
brings me to my country-level empirical analysis of the structural forces that set the stage
for PiS’ rise to power in the 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections.
The aim of the country-level empirical analysis is to find the most strategic/beneficial
combination of country-level conditions in which a right-wing populist party would emerge
and successfully operate. Such conditions are created by opportunity structures. Political
scientist, Herbert Kitschelt, defines an opportunity structure as a “specific configurations of
resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which
facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in
others” (1986:58). Given that agendas of PiS and parties alike are anti-establishment and
politically and socially polarizing, they may be in fact considered as forms of protest
movements. The selected independent variables serve as the institutional and/or social
resources, which build opportunity structures.
In an effort to draw conclusions on the systematic development of contemporary
right-wing populism, firstly I use a comparative framework to analyze the climate of the
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Polish civil society to that of its seven democratic/post-communist counterparts in Eastern
Europe—Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

.

[13]

The purpose of this chapter is to report on the country-level empirical research (i.e.,
multivariate regressions) conducted for the thesis and to highlight the key findings. In the
following chapter, the discussion is supplemented with a party-level data analysis.
I.

Research Design and Execution: Key Structural Forces At Play
The total vote share of right-wing populist parties during the most recent

parliamentary election in each of the eight comparison countries represents the dependent
variable (y)[14] of the multivariate regression analysis. The classification of a party as
“populist” is oftentimes relative [15]. For the purpose of my country-level examination, I
identify right-wing populist parties based on the widely cited 2010/2014 Chapel Hill Expert
Surveys (CHES), which offer insights on party-ideology location. My dataset only includes
right-wing populist parties that satisfy three criteria points: 1) party is positioned at 6.5 or
above on the right-left political spectrum (0—10 scale mean value in left/right dimension; 5
representing “centrist” leaning) denoted in the CHES database, 2) party holds at least one
[16]

of the following policy stands, which literature associates

[17]

with right-wing populist rule

based on precedent: strongly supports civil law and order (CIVILB_LAWORDER CHES
variable); strongly promotes nationalist rather than cosmopolitan conceptions of society
(nationalism CHES variable); is in favor of assimilation rather than multiculturalism, in
terms of immigration policy (MULTICULTURALISM CHES variable); opposes more rights for
[13]

In order to have a more homogenous sample, Bulgaria and Romania are excluded from the analysis. These two
nations have party systems, which have not (fully) consolidated post-communist rule; hence, it’s difficult to
differentiate between populist and non-populist actors.
[14]
The dependent variable is also referred to as “the vote”, particularly while analyzing the correlation coefficient
matrix and the multivariate regressions.
[15]
See more in Chapter II, subsection I.
[16]
Most of the parties in the sample hold at least two of the selected policy stands. The parties that only hold one
criteria policy were included because they gained at least 5 percent of the total vote share and are either
positioned closely to the 6.0 CHES score (on a 1-10 CHES scale), which serves as the benchmark of what
constitutes a “strong” policy position for the purposes of my selection criteria, or in the case that if they were not
included in the 2014 CHES dataset (as some actors did not exist in 2014) the party’s public manifestos were
analyzed to ensure fit.
[17]
Given the elastic nature of populism in general, a party, which holds such policy stands, is not by default
populist. I chose such criteria as these policy stands resemble positions of PiS and have been associated with other
right-wing populist parties in the past. An economic policy stand was not part of the policy criteria as positions
varied widely across the elected right-wing parties in the eight nations included in the sample.
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ethnic minorities (ETHNIC_MINORITIES CHES variable); and, 3) party gained at least one
seat in the parliament in the country’s most recent election. Figure 15 displays a
comprehensive list of the 24 parties, which satisfy the country-level selection criteria. The
election data is gathered from ParlGov, “a data infrastructure for political science [, which]
contains information for all EU and most OECD democracies.”
Figure 15: Most Recent Parliamentary Elections—Presence of Right-Wing Populist Parties
Vote
Share

Seat
Share

2015

37.6

51.1*

Right-wing

2015

8.8

9.1

6.5

Conservative

2014

44.9

66.0*

7.4

Conservative

2013

12.0

10.5

7.4

Conservative

2013

7.7

8.0

7.4

Conservative

2013

6.9

7.0

7.0

Social
Democracy

2014

20.7

23.3

7.9

Christian
Democracy

2014

5.6

5.6

7.4

Conservative

2016

11.0

12.7

7.0

Right-wing

2016

8.6

10.0

8.7

Right-wing

2016

8.0

9.3

8.7

Right-wing

2016

6.6

7.3

Most-Hid (Most-Híd)

7.4

Right-wing

2016

6.5

7.3

Network (Sieť)

7.4

Conservative

2016

5.6

6.7

7.9

Liberal

2015

27.7

29.7*

8.5

Conservative

2015

13.7

13.9

Free Party (Eesti Vabaerakond)

7.4

Conservative

2015

8.7

7.9

Unity (Vienotība)

7.4

Conservative

2014

21.9

23.0

8.3

Right-wing

2014

16.6

17.0

7.4

Conservative

2014

6.7

8.0

7.4

Conservative

2014

6.9

7.0

Party Name

L-R
Spectrum

Party Family

Year
Elected

Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)

7.7

Conservative

Kukiz'15 (Kukiz'15)

8.7

Hungary

Fidesz -- Hungarian Civic Party/Christian
Democratic People's Party (Coalition)

The Czech
Republic

Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09
(Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita 09)

Country
Poland

Civic Democratic Party
(Občanská demokratická strana)
Dawn of Direct Democracy
(Úsvit přímé demokracie)
Slovenia

Slovakia

Estonia

Latvia

Slovenian Democratic Party
(Slovenska demokratska stranka)
New Slovenia -- Christian People's Party
(Nova Slovenija – Krščanska
ljudskastranka)
Ordinary People and Independent
(Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti)
Slovak National Party
(Slovenská národná strana)
Kotleba -- People's Party Our Slovakia
(Kotleba–Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko)
We are family -- Boris Kollar
(Sme Rodina – Boris Kollár)

Estonian Reform Party
(Eesti Reformierakond)
Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica
(Erakond Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit)

National Alliance All For Latvia -- For
Fatherland and Freedom / LNNK
(Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!” –
„Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK”)
Latvian Association of Regions
(Latvijas Reģionu apvienība)
For Latvia from the Heart (No sirds
Latvijai)

(% of
Total)

(% of
Total)
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Lithuania

Homeland Union (Tėvynės Sąjunga)

7.4

Conservative

2016

22.6

22.0

Liberals Movement of the Republic of
Lithuania (Lietuvos Respublikos Liberalų
7.8
Liberal
2016
9.5
9.9
sąjūdis)
Lithuanian Centre Party
8.7
Right-wing
2016
6.3
0.7
(Lietuvos Centro Partija)
Note: 0—10 scale mean value in L/R dimension; “*” = highest number of seats in parliament Data Source: ParlGov

The total vote share of the listed above right-wing populist parties during the most
recent parliamentary election in each of the eight comparison countries is the dependent
variable of the multivariate country-level regressions. The independent variables (x)
represent the key five structural forces, which likely affected/shaped the Polish civil society
in 2015 and in the years following up to the election, and which are of universal interest to
analysts of European voter behavior/psychology. The five independent variables are:
X1: Democratic Sentiment/Satisfaction with Democratic Way of Life
X2: Economic Growth
X3: Religious Influence
X4: Immigration and European Union Sentiment
X5: Inclination Towards Authoritarian Rule
The rationale and description of all independent variables is included in the next subsections
of the chapter. To best understand the social context of a populism-inviting climate and to
ensure that election results did not impact the data of structural forces—if data-permitting,
the year of analysis for the five independent variables is defined as the year before the most
recent parliamentary election in each comparison country. Poland is the only exception to
this methodology. The Polish elections took place in late October, therefore any annual
statistics cover almost only pre-election time, and hence to ensure uniform cross-national
analysis, the year of elections is the year of analysis for the independent variables. Figure
16 specifies the year of analysis for the eight comparison countries and the total vote share
of right-wing populist parties per country, ranked from highest to lowest with Latvia,
Estonia, and Poland at the top.
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Figure 16: Year of Analysis and Total Voter Share (%) of Right-Wing Parties Per Country

Country

Year of Election
(N)

Country-Level
Independent Variable
Year of Analysis

Total Vote Share (%)
of Right-Wing Parties
Per Country

(N-1)

1. Latvia

2014

2013

52.1

2. Estonia

2015

2014

50.1

3. Poland

2015

2015

46.4

4. Slovakia

2016

2015

46.3

5. Hungary

2014

2014

44.9

6. The Czech
Republic

2013

2012

38.6

7. Lithuania

2016

2015

38.4

8. Slovenia

2014

2013

26.3
Data Source: ParlGov

The following subsections of the chapter offer the description, rationale, and statistical
analysis of each of the five independent variables.
A. X1: Democratic Sentiment/Satisfaction with Democratic Way of Life
The relationship between democracy and populism is complex and highly evolving.
The debate on whether the phenomenon constitutes a toxic “epidemic-like” threat to the
democratic tradition or a unifying platform for voters to regain real power—is particularly
crucial given this moment of flux in both the world and Eastern European history, as
populist politics are becoming increasingly popular and the manifestations of a “democracy
recession” are continuing to arise (Gidron and Bonikowsi 2013, 17-18). The current era is
defined by the “decline in formal [citizen] political participation such as turnout and party
membership,” which are factors historically indicative of the health/state of a nation’s
democracy and the closely related political governance (Gidron and Bonikowsi 2013, 17).
Since populist politics claim to represent the unheard and disempowered “people”/“silent
majority,” it may be inferred that populist parties aim to increase or perceive to increase the
sovereignty of citizens by granting them more direct and indirect influence/power into the
political/social affairs of a “once glorious” nation. Indeed, this is a very democratic
aspiration—which the populist rhetoric oftentimes strategically emphasizes, as embodied by
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PiS candidates. Correspondingly, in 2014, when asked how much influence on politics does
the political system allow people to have, 21.2 percent of Poles responded, “not at all”
(European Social Survey). This raises a red flag—are voters in general unsatisfied with the
democratic way of life a priori to the emergence of a populist program within a country,
which then prompts the voters’ to vote for the alleged democracy up-lifters/keepers? Given
the geographic focus of the study, it is beneficial to broaden the scope of this inquiry.
The eight comparison nations were all members of the Eastern bloc—thus, on
average operated under 44 years of Soviet-led communist control. Although on a global
scale democracy is the preferred option, a Pew Research survey conducted from June 2015
until July 2016 in eighteen Central/Eastern European countries, denotes that “no regional
consensus that democracy is preferable to other forms of government” exists. In fact, in
Poland 26 percent of total surveyed indicated “non-democratic government,” as the
preferred system. This is in line with the findings of my field study during which four
participants (out of 40), who first-handily experienced communism, expressed that life was
better under the non-democratic rule. It is worth pointing out that interviewers’ views on
communism unsurprisingly appeared to be age-dependent, i.e., most of the younger
participants believed post-communist sentiment per se has no influence on today’s politics,
yet, many indicated concerns about corruption within political elites.
Importantly, the strong anti-corruption and anti-Russia sentiment, which manifests
as distrust of governmental institutions and political actors, or “the establishment”—appears
to linger actively from the communist past of the Polish society. This reaction may be
analyzed both from a perspective of populism as political strategy and as a
doctrine/ideology. The key feature of a populist rhetoric is that it creates and/or
(over)emphasizes social dichotomies. In the case of Law and Justice, this was exemplified
in a myriad of ways. The one most closely related to this independent variable is PiS’
discursive dichotomy of “the people,” defined as the status-quo white Christian majority, vs.
the corrupt establishment of political elites—in particular the incumbent Civic Platform and
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its former leader, Donald Tusk, whom has alleged ties to the Kremlin. Based on public
discourse and media commentary, the optics of PiS’ populist proposition directed at the
strongly opposed to corruption and Russian influence Poles, in part justifies the voters’
appeal to the party and such divisive discourse. In terms of empirical evidence—the 2015
European Commission Public Opinion Survey gauges the voters’ sentiment on democratic
processes, which sheds light on whether voters’ satisfaction or dissatisfaction of them steers
citizens towards right-wing populist programs.
In November 2015, a month after the Polish elections took place, survey participants
were asked “on the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at
all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?” Figure 17 shows the
comprehensive results of the study. For the related independent variable (X1), the percent
of “very satisfied” and “fairly satisfied” is totaled, and serves as the key parameter of X1
analysis.
Figure 17: 2015 European Commission Survey On Satisfaction with Democracy

Don't Know
(% of Total)

Sum of
Satisfied
(% of
Total)

Total Vote
Share
of RightWing
Parties
(%)

5.00

7.00

62.00

46.40

35.00

19.00

1.00

45.00

44.90

45.00

39.00

10.00

2.00

49.00

38.60

2.00

28.00

43.00

25.00

2.00

30.00

26.30

Slovakia

3.00

32.00

42.00

20.00

2.00

35.00

46.30

Estonia

2.00

45.00

35.00

10.00

8.00

47.00

50.10

Latvia

6.00

42.00

36.00

13.00

4.00

48.00

52.10

Lithuania

3.00

34.00

45.00

15.00

3.00

37.00

38.40

Very
Satisfied
(% of
Total)

Fairly
Satisfied
(% of
Total)

Not Very
Satisfied
(% of
Total)

Not At All
Satisfied
(% of
Total)

7.0

55.00

26.00

Hungary

6.00

39.00

The Czech
Republic

4.00

Slovenia

Country

Poland

Data Source: European Commission Public Opinion
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Source: European Commission Public Opinion

It is important to highlight that X1 (Democratic Sentiment/Satisfaction with Democratic Way
of Life) has 0.578 or 58 percent Pearson correlation coefficient[18] with the vote (y),
suggesting a moderate uphill (positive) linear relationship between the two variables.
Correspondingly, the survey shows that Poland, the third country with most voter support
for right-wing populist programs—has the highest percent share of the combined “very
satisfied” and “fairly satisfied” categories. The survey does not provide the full story, as the
non-uniformity of quality of each nation’s democracy and the subjective nature of capturing
“satisfaction” levels with a context-dependent and rather culture-bound political system,
inevitably cannot be disregarded, while analyzing the results. Nevertheless, the datasuggested trend is the following: higher satisfaction with democracy is moderately beneficial
to right-wing populist parties, in terms of vote share. This trend is clearly not intuitive
given the prevailing, particularly in the popular media and conventional wisdom negative
sentiment on populism, and the frequently seen positive discourse around democracy.

[18]

The Pearson correlation coefficient is “a measure of the strength of a linear association between two variables
and is denoted by r. Basically, a Pearson correlation attempts to draw a line of best fit through the data of two
variables, and the Pearson correlation coefficient, r, indicates how far away all these data points are to this line of
best fit (i.e., how well the data points fit this new model/line of best fit)” (Aerd Statistics).
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Two possible explanations of this trend come to mind.
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First, it may appear that the

finding is an ecological fallacy, which “consists in thinking that relationships observed for
groups necessarily hold for individuals” (Freedman 1991, 1). Moreover, this implies a
pattern where increasing satisfaction with the democratic way of life overall reflects the
increasing polarization between the satisfied majority and the dissatisfied minority that feels
excluded and left behind. Hence, it might well be that the latter group provides critical
support for populist parties. Yet, given the wide range of demographic groups that voted
for PiS in 2015 the analysis becomes even more complex. Out of the total vote share, PiS
held “46.8 percent of the votes among inhabitants of rural areas [the Civic Platform held
17.3 percent of the votes], 36 percent among inhabitants of small towns, as well as 52.3
percent among farmers and 45.4 percent among workers” (Wojtasik 2016). Furthermore,
Law and Justice won the higher education vote with 30.4 percent (PO held 26.7 percent),
and the adolescents/students vote with 23.9 percent, while PO only managed to acquire
13.2 percent (Wojtasik 2016). Given PiS galvanized meaningful support of diverse groups
of voters, an achievement they were not able to accomplish in 2008—it appears that in
2015 there was no one dissatisfied minority, which substantially pushed the party to victory.
The second explanation behind the trend revolves around what appears to me, as a
crucial feature of populism—the persuasive power of illusion fueled by emotional and/or
sentimental appeal. The “tension between liberal democracy and populism stems from the
ways in which these ideologies perceive the relations between representative institutions
and the ‘will of the people’” (Gidron and Bonikowsi 2013, 18). Moreover, Canovan explains
this tension in terms of different visions of democracy by populists and the traditional
establishment actors. Populists view democracy “as an ideology and practice of popular
participation,” and as a system that is operated/led by ‘the people’ rather than political
elites (Canovan 2002, 25). There is a clear disconnect on who the ultimate/real decisionmaker is—the citizen or the elected politician. This prompts the populist representative to
ambiguously call for a “true” democracy where “the people” have a legitimate and impactful
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voice—while not adequately depicting the complexity of decision-making processes. Law
and Justice and its calls for a more open non-corrupt government exemplify this dynamic.
Perhaps the populist illusion of a utopic-like democratic state of political affairs naturally
galvanizes the voters’ support given its enticing proposition of citizen empowerment. Or,
more simply, voters are starting to resent the mediocrity of the “somewhat satisfying”
democratic state and are excited by the populist prospect of an alleged “very satisfying”
democratic vision.
B. X2: Economic Growth
One of many ways to analyze voter behavior is with an issues-based approach, which
frequently emphasizes “the idea of a reasoning voter, who weighs the pluses and minuses
of candidate platforms before voting” (Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 2018). An example of
such analysis is economic voting, which naturally focuses on the issue of economy and
economic wellbeing. Given populism has historically occurred in a wide array of economic
environments, it’s beneficial to examine under what economic circumstances it has
developed in Poland and Eastern Europe.
In 2015, Poland was relatively economically stable—the country recorded a 3.914
GDP per capita growth (among the highest in Europe), 7.50 percent unemployment (percent
of total labor force), an annual deflation of -0.991, and healthy “public finances with a
budget deficit below 3 percent of GDP” (World Bank). Stable economic growth was also
reflected in the years following up to the elections. Since the country officially became a
democratic state in 1989—“for more than two decades the average economic growth [in
Poland] reached 4 percent a year, faster than other countries of Central and Eastern Europe
[and] per capita income increased from 29 percent of its German equivalent in 1992 to 55
percent in 2014 [, significantly narrowing the gap between the living standards in Poland
and Western Europe]” (Tatala 2016, 44)

. On the surface—the key economic indicators,

[19]

along with factors such as Poland’s favorable position during the global financial crisis of
[19]

For detailed economic history of Poland, see chapter III, p. 38.
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2008, the model economic growth/risk profile post 2004 EU membership, and the expansion
of urban infrastructure, which all occurred under the rule of the Civic Platform party—
highlight that the incumbent’s conservative and predictable policymaking was at least
somewhat successful in general. Hence, the theory of pocket/economic voting would
suggest that Poles would keep the Civic Platform in office, as “incumbents who have
presided over economic prosperity are rewarded at the polls, while those who are deemed
responsible for decline are punished” (Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck 2018). Since this event
did not transpire at the polls in 2015, it is worthy to investigate this phenomenon on a
systematic scale in an effort to find whether Poland was simply an outlier in terms of its
economic position.
For the independent variable (X2), three key economic country-level indicators—
annual GDP per capita growth, annual unemployment, and annual inflation—serve as the
data parameters of X2 analysis. Figure 18 displays the comprehensive results.
Figure 18: Key Economic Indicators

(annual %)

Total Vote
Share
of Right-Wing
Parties (%)

Poland

2015

3.914

7.50

-0.991

46.40

Hungary

2013

2.378

10.20

1.721

44.90

The Czech
Republic

2012

-0.939

7.00

3.299

38.60

Slovenia

2013

-1.266

10.10

1.40

26.30

Slovakia

2015

3.751

11.50

-0.325

46.30

Estonia

2014

3.161

7.40

-0.145

50.10

Latvia

2013

3.684

11.90

0

52.10

Lithuania

2015

2.741

11.80

-0.884

38.40

Country

Year of
Analysis

GDP per capita
growth

Unemployment

(annual %)

(% of total
labor force)

Inflation,
consumer
prices

Data Source: World Bank

A 0.832 Pearson coefficient was recorded for the GDP per capita growth vs. vote (y)
correlation, which reveals a strong uphill (positive) linear relationship. Thus, it may be
inferred that as GDP per capita increases, the right-wing populist vote at least moderately
heightens. Latvia and Poland recorded the highest GDP per capita growth—correspondingly,
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the nations ranked first and third respectively in the comparison of total vote share of rightwing parties per nation, highlighted in the table above. Perhaps, the Polish case best
explains the reasoning behind this correlation trend. Since Poland’s economic growth was
positive and the nation had a promising future economic outlook, PiS had a
truthful/justifiable structural platform to propose a political agenda that aimed to expand
the social welfare state (e.g., particularly granting more benefits for families). The Law and
Justice heroic proposition of “we can afford more benefits for you” was naturally enticing for
voters across most demographic groups—even for those who were not financially struggling
or unsatisfied with the incumbent’s rule. It’s not surprising that Polish voters preferred their
individual short-run monetary benefits to the long-run healthy economic growth of the
nation, as proposed by the Civic Platform agenda. The correlation result is also reflective of
the findings revealed in my field study—when asked about the overall standing of the Polish
economy, the majority of participants depicted it as “good”/”strong”/”fine.” Moreover, 34
participants hoped to see more social welfare benefits and were in favor of PiS’ PLN500+
policy (i.e., monthly allowance of PLN500 per child for families with 2+ children), which
adds an estimated $11 billion to the 2018 government budget (Miszerak and Rohac 2016).
In terms of unemployment—the correlation between the parameter and the vote (y)
is -0.011, suggesting no effective association. The range for the unemployment is between
7 percent and 11.9 percent. Importantly, the unemployment data is not particularly out of
the ordinary, as single-digit unemployment is usually considered stable in Eastern Europe
(Münich and Svejnar 2007). The Pearson correlation coefficient for annual inflation and the
vote (y) is -0.41223, indicating a weak downhill (negative) linear relationship between the
two variables. It is worthy to highlight, half of the sample countries, including Poland,
experienced low levels of deflation, while Latvia experienced no inflation or deflation. In the
countries where inflation was in fact present, the indicator was recorded below two percent,
with the exception of the Czech Republic at 3.299 percent. This signifies that there was no
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significant/meaningful rise in consumer prices that was responsible for triggering the public
to vote for a right-wing populist program with a heightened social welfare agenda.
Although the three key economic indicators propose that a stable economic
environment is in fact beneficial for right-wing parties, it may be worthwhile to broaden the
scope of this economic discussion. Even though on a country level, Poland has consistently
shown signs of optimistic economic growth—many groups of voters feel disadvantaged and
economically anxious on an individual level. Such disempowered groups are frequently
strong supporters of PiS. Thus, it’s beneficial to further examine their economic
circumstances. Although unemployment levels are not high—there exists a lack of
quality/professional jobs in “small towns and rural regions, especially in eastern Poland
[where] many people are working under short-term contracts that carry few protections or
benefits” (Tworzecki and Markowski 2015). This observation is also in line with the
fluctuating recordings of wealth inequality indicators (e.g., Gini Index) seen in the recent
years. Although “absolute poverty has declined steadily over the past two decades in
Poland,” earnings inequality do not show improvements of significant magnitude, indicating
that the economic strides/benefits created in part through PO-led and EU initiatives appear
to be somewhat unequally distributed across economic classes and regions (i.e., urban vs.
rural divide) (Tworzecki and Markowski 2015). As displayed in figure 19—since 2004, the
year of Poland’s accession into the EU, the country has decreased its Gini coefficient by 3.3
percent, indicating positive yet not significant improvement.
Figure 19: Gini Index—Poland (1998–2014)
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Data Source: World Bank
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Civic Platform’s concurrent implementation of fiscally conservative policies and the
recorded reduction in wealth inequality is an achievement—given that the two factors
generally have a tradeoff relationship. Yet, the positive development did not translate as
such to some groups of voters. “Pockets of poverty and economic stagnation remain, and
PiS was able to exploit growing frustration in some areas that the spoils of economic
success are not more evenly shared” (Sobczak and Szary 2015).
The European Commission poll conducted in May 2015 indicates that 47 percent of
Poles judged the quality of life, which naturally includes economic realities in Poland, as
“rather bad” and 10 percent as “very bad.” This may have added to voters’ frustrations as
the post-EU accession expectations of greater social mobility and better job prospects,
became disappointments for some Poles across the country, particularly in the Eastern
region. Such trends were also highlighted in the conducted survey, in which 34 participants
expressed that the most important problem Poland faces today is of economic nature,
referring to unemployment particularly within the younger population and Eastern regions of
the country, inflation of goods/services, and the stagnation of wages. Furthermore, in
recent years there has been a sharp rise of workers who are employed in ways that are
associated with high risk of job loss and instability, along with poverty. In 2015, 26.9
percent of all employed Poles, worked under temporary contracts, as compared to 4.7
percent in 1998, illustrating the “largest increase among the EU countries” (Arak et. al.
2014). “On average, these individuals earn less than workers employed under open-ended
contracts (even if other factors which influence wages are accounted for), are exposed to a
higher risk of job loss and poverty and have worse promotion and skill acquisition prospects
[as] only a small number of temporary workers is ever going to switch to stable
employment” (Arak et. al. 2014). The additional social welfare benefits presented by PiS’
agenda particularly appealed to the economically dislocated voters, as well as, to those who
shared the intensifying feelings of economic frustration/alienation—thus, who naturally
valued and considered the short-term individual benefits more than budget-straining long62
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term economic performance of the country (Ádám and Bozóki 2015, 4). PiS’ rhetoric aimed
to reassure the forgotten and politically isolated people with policy promises of individual
economic development and growth. The party’s proposition of giving back power to “the
people” represents a crucial feature of the populist ideology (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012).
C. X3: Religious Influence
A trust-inducing community where “the people” feel “‘warm’ and ‘safe,’ [and there
exists a clear understanding of] . . . who is ‘one of us’ and who is not” appears to be a
critical element of the populist philosophy (Bauman 2001, 12). This best captures the core
populist rhetoric that creates and/or overemphasizes a social dichotomy between “the
people” and the symbolic “enemy”/antagonistic “stranger,” or the familiar “good” and the
alien “evil.” In relatively homogenous societies, this appears to be especially politically
expedient, thus powerful. The Polish civil society is particularly homogenous in terms of
race, ethnicity, and religion. On average 96.7 percent of Poland's population comprises of
ethnic Poles, indicating minimal diversity and immigrant inflow; and, 87.2 percent identifies
with Catholicism (CIA). Hence, the virtuous “people” in the eyes of the populist Law and
Justice represent the Catholic/Christian white majority.
Historically, religion served as a unifying and politically important (in terms of
agenda-setting) force in Poland’s homogenous society. Active participation in religious life
and the moral leadership provided by the Catholic Church are factors, which frequently
significantly shape a Pole’s identity at the individual and collective level (Buzalka 2005, 12).
Although “economic and institutional approaches have been favored in the study of
populism,” it is crucial to “pay systematic attention to cultural religious structures and
narratives that provide followers with a mobilizing sacred [in Poland’s case, influenced by
Catholicism] worldview” (Zúquete 2013, 264). Crucially, despite a constitutional separation
of church and state, the Catholic Church in Poland uses its traditionally privileged position to
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provide endorsement of political candidates through its affiliated media platforms [20]. Since
the outlets’ inception two years after the fall of communism, PiS holds close ties with
religious media, which serve as platforms for the political outreach of the party. In fact, the
Catholic Church is a strong ally/supporter of PiS candidates, who commonly emphasize and
incorporate the Catholic way of life in their policy agendas. It is inferred that the Polish
Catholic Church provides a powerful, almost unequivocal—especially for the church-going
voters—source of legitimacy for PiS. Given how impactful religion and religious institutions
are in the private and public/political life of Poles, these elements appear to be important to
the analysis of the Polish case.
Yet how crucial are these influences in creating the necessary trust-inducing populist
narrative/community in the remaining comparison nations, in which populations are also
relatively homogenous in terms of religious and cultural backgrounds? The most recent
(2010) European Commission survey gauges the trust levels in religious institutions in each
sample country. The percentage of population, which “tends to trust” religious institutions,
is the data parameter for the independent variable (x3) analysis. Figure 20 displays the
results.
Figure 20: 2010 European Commission Survey—Trust in Religious Institutions
Year of
Analysis
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Share
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2010

42.00

11.00

47.00

46.40

2010

37.00

13.00

51.00

44.90

The Czech
Republic

2010

61.00

9.00

30.00

38.60

Slovenia

2010

65.00

5.00

30.00

26.30

Slovakia

2010

42.00

4.00

54.00

46.30

Estonia

2010

50.00

20.00

31.00

50.10

Latvia

2010

46.00

11.00

43.00

52.10

Lithuania

2010

39.00

12.00

48.00

38.40

Country

(% of population)

Data Source: European Commission Public Opinion

[20]

For detailed description of the prominent position of the Catholic Church in Poland and its affiliated religious
media platforms, see chapter III, p. 42.
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Source: European Commission Public Opinion

X3 has a 0.399 Pearson correlation coefficient with the vote (y), suggesting a weak
uphill (positive) linear relationship between the two variables. It’s important to highlight
that Poland’s social environment is rather unique in terms of religious influence/belonging,
thus direct comparison does not provide ample explanatory power on a systematic scale.
The missionary-like subculture constructed by the religious media outlets and the Polish
Catholic Church allows for PiS’ successful mass mobilization of voters, given the alliance
between the actors. The Church’s confidence in PiS leaders oftentimes legitimizes voters’
trust and support for the party, due to the sacred setting and the power that is bestowed to
the institution and those affiliated with it. Unlike secular media platforms, such religious
programs start with prayers, organize pilgrimages and lobbying demonstrations, provide a
call-in line to discuss family matters, and most importantly form a trust-inducing community
whose members share an enthusiasm for the common Catholic tradition. Altogether, these
platforms produce a source of politically expedient social capital for PiS. Francis Fukuyama
defines social capital “as an instantiated informal norm that promotes co-operation between
two or more individuals [and] stresses that religion for centuries has been one of its most
important sources [yet, it may] produce social cohesion and increase trust within a given
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group at the expense of larger society” (Burdziej 2005, 218). Indeed, the rather
interventionist platforms emphasize the distrust of the larger society and glorify their trust
of the populist PiS. This again, highlights the dichotomy-creating nature of populist
ideology and politics. The party leader’s 2015 statement: “PiS would not have won without
[, one of the most popular religious radio stations,] Radio Maryja” is one of many
testimonies that demonstrate the critical role the Catholic Church and the religious media
played in the party’s mass-mobilization ("Courting Disaster" 2016). My field study revealed
similar themes—24 interviewees stated they wish to see the position of the Catholic Church
remain as is, and only 12 participants wished to decrease religious influence in political
affairs. Sentiment about religious media was highly dependent on whether the participant
was its consumer—17 interviewees mentioned they hope religious media to hold less
influence.
Perhaps, the platform of mass mobilization granted by the Catholic Church to Law
and Justice serves as the foundation of Taggart’s “heartland” or Bauman’s “warm and safe”
populist community. This dynamic is also evidenced in Hungary, led by Victor Orbán, where
a complex relationship “between right-wing populism and religion [that] has been created
(...) in the past 25 years” (Ádám and Bozóki 2015, 1). Hungarian religious institutions also
provide ideological legitimacy for the right-wing programs, “essentially playing a
propaganda role for [Orbán’s] regime” (Ádám and Bozóki 2015, 25). The caveat of the
Hungarian mass-mobilization is that the populists “advocate a highly nationalistic surrogatereligion in which the nation itself becomes a sacred entity and national identification carries
religious attributes” (Ádám and Bozóki 2015, 24).
Such powerful religious mass-mobilization, as seen in Poland and Hungary, is by no
means a norm in the remaining comparison countries, as also evidenced by the weak
correlation trend. Given the culture-bound and context-dependent nature of populism,
perhaps right-wing populism does not require trust in religious institutions that reinforce
and propagate the populist programs, per se. It may be that any form of mass66
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mobilization, which induces trust and belonging, and is reinforced by at least one key social
structure serves as a sufficient platform for the populist programs to create a unifying,
oftentimes streamlined, and covertly non-political narrative, which then prompts feelings of
hope and national progress in the eyes of the voters. This perspective is aligned with the
Polish-native scholar of populism, Rafal Pankowski, who argues that “populist movements
have been successful where they manage to make a connection with a culture of the
‘common sense’ ordinariness. In the Polish case, for instance, such taken-for-granted
‘truths’ include the claim that ‘all Poles are Catholics’” (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013, 6-7).
The following question that arises is—are all voters equally enticed by this populist vision?
In Poland, the Catholic Church and its affiliated platforms appear to be the most
influential in rural regions—as work and faith are the ethos of most countryside
communities (Lyman 2016). Correspondingly, in 2015 elections PiS galvanized support in
the majority of Polish rural regions—specifically, “46.8 percent of the votes among
inhabitants of rural areas [, while the Civic Platform captured only 17.3 percent of the
votes]” (Wojtasik 2016). Historically, public discourse and media highlight a social and
economic divide between the rural and the urban communities. Thus, it may be beneficial
to analyze whether empirical data reveals any systematic themes. The results of my field
survey indicate mixed views about the rural vs. urban divide in Eastern Poland. In fact, 16
participants stated that a divide between rural and city/urban residents (due to a
combination of economic and cultural differences) continues to exist. For the empirical
analysis, the rural population (percent of total population) and urban population (percent of
total population) serve as key data parameters. Figure 21 displays the related data.
Figure 21: Urban vs. Rural Demographics

Country

Year of
Analysis

Rural
Population

Urban
Population
(% of total
population)

Total Vote
Share
of Right-Wing
Parties (%)

(% of total
population)

Poland

2015

39.50

60.50

46.40

Hungary

2013

29.70

70.30

44.90
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The Czech
Republic

2012

26.90

73.10

38.60

Slovenia

2013

50.20

49.80

26.30

Slovakia

2015

46.40

53.60

46.30

Estonia

2014

32.40

67.60

50.10

Latvia

2013

32.50

67.50

52.10

Lithuania

2015

33.50

66.50

38.40
Data Source: World Bank

The rural population data parameter has -0.437 Pearson correlation coefficient with the vote
(y), suggesting a weak downhill (negative) linear relationship between the two variables.
Correspondingly, Pearson coefficient of 0.437 is recorded for the urban population
parameter vs. vote (y) correlation. The data suggest that there is no significant statistical
evidence that either rural or urban populations are more inclined to vote for right-wing
populist programs, given the weak association presented by the correlations. This theme
highlights the context dependence of populism and its successful adaptation to a wide range
of social, economic, and cultural backgrounds. The heightened popularity of PiS in urban
areas, as indicated by the vote distribution, further evidences the phenomenon.
D. X4: Immigration and European Union Sentiment
The populist identification of which groups are in fact “the people,”/“the masses,”—
the essence of any type of populism—is particularly troubling as parts of the demos are
excluded and oftentimes politically demonized to create (or heighten) a sense of
common/unifying fear of groups labeled as “the other”/“the alien”/“the non virtuous
stranger” (Canovan 2002, 247-249). Unsurprisingly, this ideological position of social
stratification and alienation has on precedent led to stigmatization of minorities who in the
populist narrative/illusion are portrayed as the outsider in a homogenous and virtuous
nation (Bauman 2001, 12-13). Moreover, the “enemy” is frequently “accused of conspiring
together against ‘the people,’” which constructs an illusion of a virtuous populist leader who
leads the, now unified by common source of fear/anxiety, nation to a symbolically trustinducing victory over “the enemies” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 5). This mental
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framework was exemplified by Law and Justice, which portrayed migrants, asylum-seekers,
EU elites, and domestic political elites as the heathenized “outsiders”/“enemies.” In Poland,
it appears that this political philosophy was in part particularly powerful and well received
due to the lack of ethnic diversity throughout Polish modern history.
The discourse of exclusionary politics in a relatively homogenous Polish civil society
is especially politically expedient, as PiS uses fear-inducing/managing discursive strategies
to empower/overemphasize the negative sentiment around immigration and the European
Union elites responsible for the migration quotas, hence for opening borders to the alleged
“alien.” Correspondingly, PiS’ derogatory anti-refugee rhetoric is not representative of EU’s
stand and goals on the European migrant crisis. Furthermore, during the 2015 campaigns
Law and Justice government officials used and continue to use fear tactics related to
immigration and terrorism. For instance, the party members displayed “maps of Europe
with blood-red ink covering areas they say are victims of refugee-driven terrorism and
[vow] to ‘protect’ Poles and their children from immigration and keep the country of 38
million ‘safe’ from attacks” (Strzelecki 2017). The public also reciprocates this troubling
sentiment and discourse. During my field study, 35 interviewees (out of 40) stated they do
not want more immigration inflow, and many used derogatory language, while referring to
Syrian refugees (e.g., “We don’t need more rapists and thieves—I have kids”). Given that
this mental framework of interpreting social and political forces is shared by other European
nations, particularly Hungary, a systematic analysis would be beneficial.
The independent variable (x4) aims to discover whether ethnic homogeneity in part
provides a structural basis for the popularity of anti-migrant and anti-EU public sentiment,
which plays the role of the “villain” in PiS’ populist illusion. The first x4 data parameter is
the commonly used Ethnic Fractionalization Index (2003), which “captures the probability
that two individuals randomly drawn from the population belong to different groups, and
reaches a theoretical maximum of 1 when every individual belongs to a different group,
[thus indicating maximum level of ethnic diversity]” (Alesina and La Ferrara 2003, 793).
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The second parameter is the international migrant stock (percent of population) in 2015,
which includes refugees and asylum-seekers and portrays the data in relative rather than
absolute terms. Figure 22 lists the comprehensive data.
Figure 22: Ethnic Fractionalization Index (2003) and International Migrant Stock (2015)
Ethnic
Fractionalization
Index

International
Migrant Stock

(% of population)

Total Vote Share
of Right-Wing
Parties (%)

Poland

0.1183

1.60

46.40

Hungary

0.1522

4.60

44.90

The Czech
Republic

0.3222

3.80

38.60

Slovenia

0.2216

11.40

26.30

Slovakia

0.2539

3.30

46.30

Estonia

0.5062

15.40

50.10

Latvia

0.5867

13.40

52.10

Lithuania

0.3223

4.70

38.40

Country

Data Sources: World Bank; Alesina and La Ferrara (2003)

The ethnic diversity parameter has a 0.442 Pearson correlation coefficient with the
vote (y), suggesting a weak uphill (positive) linear relationship between the two variables.
One explanation of this relationship may be that this is an ecological fallacy and/or that the
data is skewed due to a small sample size. Another interpretation, in line with the
frequently seen populist dichotomy of us vs. them, suggests that more diversity intensifies
social stratification, heightens tensions between groups, and thus awakes feelings of
anxiety, threat, and fear of losing the privileged status in the majority group. In the Polish
case, it was the white Catholic majority, socially and economically threatened by the alleged
non-virtuous outsiders—as indicated by the PiS political “protective” agenda and rhetoric.
A Pearson coefficient of 0.112 is recorded for the international migrant stock
parameter vs. vote (y) correlation, indicating no association or a very weak positive one.
The weak relationship arises, perhaps, due to a small and not random enough sample of
analysis. The elasticity and context dependence of populism is repeatedly brought to life.
Despite these two weak correlation trends, it appears that it’s important to account for how
politically expedient, yet, dangerous (in terms of inclusive global development and
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humanitarian efforts) PiS’ dichotomous discourse against the refugees and EU elites was in
2015 and continues to be today. In fact, PiS was able to position the party at the top of
opinion polls “by shouting about danger from migration and terrorism” (Strzelecki 2017).
The framework of fear and anxiety built around the nation’s common “enemy” is one of the
defining strategies of right-wing populist politics in Europe—as both scholarly literature and
popular media suggests.

The importance of voters’ perception of alleged threat and who is

eager to combat it directly appears to have critical significance at the polls.
E. X5: Inclination Towards Authoritarian Rule
Despite Poland’s successful post-communist transformation into a relatively stable
democratic state, the popularity of PiS’ authoritarian-like rhetoric/policy goals of intensified
social conformity and law and order appears to be gaining momentum—based on the 2015
content in the popular media and PiS’ successful position in the opinion polls (Strzelecki).
Academic research identifies an authoritarian populist party by its core anti-liberal, yet
democratic principals—which amply represents PiS’ ideological position (Heino 2017, 7)[21].
In the case of Law and Justice, this was manifested in a myriad of ways. For instance, the
program’s emphasis on “the people” vs. corrupt political establishment dichotomy, the
party’s “lack of interest in and even patience with constitutional rule of law (…) and
prefer[ence of] fewer speed bumps in the democratic process in order for temporary
majorities to legislate and enforce new laws,” and the party’s “quest for a more powerful
state”—are all manifestations of PiS’ authoritarian-like ideological inclinations (Heino 2017,
8-9). Voters who have tendencies to support authoritarian programs are obedient, “rally to
and follow strong leaders [and] respond aggressively to outsiders, especially when they feel
threatened” (Macwilliams 2016). Yet more importantly on a systematic scale—to what
degree structural country-level conditions usher voters to choose an authoritarian-leaning
populist agenda and in result to some extent erode the liberal democratic institutions and
governance practices?
[21]

For more theory on authoritarian populism, see chapter II, page 21.
71

Intuitively, it may be hypothesized that a well-functioning democratic state with a
political culture that does not alienate its voters but rather actively engages them would be
attuned and resistant enough to combat authoritarian populist propositions, which
oftentimes either covertly or overtly erode freedoms and/or skew the balance of power. If
so, then democracies with weaker functioning of government would in fact provide a more
beneficial environment for an authoritarian populist program to emerge and thrive in. This
claim is examined further by The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, which
focuses on five key categories: “electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the
functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.” Following, “based
on [nation’s] scores on a range of indicators within these categories, each country is then
itself classified as one of four types of regime: ‘full democracy’; ‘flawed democracy’; ‘hybrid
regime’; and ‘authoritarian regime’.” The index scores serve as the data parameter for
gauging the inclination towards authoritarian rule (X5). The possible scores are depicted on
a 1-10 scale. A score of 10 represents a full-democracy, while a score of 1 indicates an
authoritarian regime. Figure 23 displays the related scores.
Figure 23: The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index

Country

Year of
Analysis

Democracy
Index Score

State of
Democracy
Category

Total Vote
Share
of RightWing Parties
(%)

Poland

2015

7.09

Flawed Democracy

46.40

Hungary

2013

6.96

Flawed Democracy

44.90

The Czech
Republic

2012

8.19

Full Democracy

38.60

Slovenia

2013

7.88

Flawed Democracy

26.30

Slovakia

2015

7.29

Flawed Democracy

46.30

Estonia

2014

7.74

Flawed Democracy

50.10

Latvia

2013

7.05

Flawed Democracy

52.10

Lithuania

2015

7.54

Flawed Democracy

38.40

Data Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit

The democracy index parameter has a -0.588 Pearson correlation coefficient with the
vote (y), suggesting a moderate downhill (negative) linear relationship between the two
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variables. Yet, admittedly variance in the scores between the countries is not overwhelming
and some right-wing populists have been in power prior to the most recent elections in the
comparison countries (e.g. in Hungary), thus already had the opportunity to weaken
democratic institutions and processes. Nevertheless, the correlation trend may imply that
as the state of democracy becomes more authoritarian-like, the vote for right-wing populist
parties moderately increases. This in fact supports the beforehand mentioned hypothesis.
Perhaps, voters in structurally flawed democracies of Eastern Europe are moderately more
inclined to choose a right-wing populist program, which aims to restore the
order/inefficiencies of the damaged institutional processes of governance in place with
authoritarian-like restructuring. In practice, this translates as a more powerful state with
less citizen freedoms—as best witnessed by the Polish case and its radical freedomdiminishing social and institutional reforms
II.

.

[22]

The Proximity Matrix: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
The proximity matrix provides a summarized view of all Pearson correlation

coefficients between the country-level data parameters representative of the five
independent variables. To recap, GDP per capita (Pearson coefficient of 0.832) and the
satisfaction with democracy variable (Pearson coefficient of 0.579) has the highest positive
correlations with the vote. Inclination towards authoritarian rule parameter (Pearson
coefficient of -0.588) has the highest negative correlation with the dependent variable.

[22]

The last chapter provides a summary of the thus far seen effects of PiS’ rule. See more on page 107.
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III.

Multivariate Regressions: Key Country-Level Structural Packages
The two country-level structural packages propose strategic opportunity structures,

in which a right-wing populism program may possibly rise to power and obtain a vote share
dependent on the degree to which the variables exist in a nation. High annual GDP per
capita growth, large international migrant stock, and a small rural population are the
structural forces, which constitute the first package. The second opportunity structure is
constructed when citizens are greatly satisfied with democracy/democratic way of life, have
more trust in religious institutions, and the population is significantly ethnically diverse. The
two packages were assessed and computed in the following way.
Multivariate linear regressions (confidence interval of 95 percent; tolerance level of
0.10) of the variables, analyzed in the prior sections of the chapter, were performed to
attempt to find the most statistically significant country-level structural packages that
empower right-wing populist parties. It is important to disclose that multivariate
regressions with only a sample size of eight cases are extremely unlikely to produce any
significant observations/conclusions on a systematic scale. For the purposes of my thesis,
the modeling served as a technical exercise to combine two or three of my hypotheses
(represented by the independent variables). The accuracy of the country-level
models/packages was chiefly based on 1) achieving the greatest adjusted R2—which
represents the “corrected

[23]

goodness-of-fit measure for linear models [and] identifies the

percentage of variance in the target field that is explained by the inputs”—with unique

[24]

variables that have low correlations with each other (i.e., less than 0.50 Pearson coefficient)
and on 2) keeping the variance inflation factors (VIF), which measures how much
multicollinearity exists, at low levels (i.e., 1 < VIF < 1.2) [25] (IBM Knowledge Center). The
next subsection of the chapter highlights two key packages.

[23]

“R2 tends to optimistically estimate the fit of the linear regression. It always increases, as higher number of
effects is included in the model. Adjusted R2 attempts to correct for this overestimation. It might decrease if the
effect does not improve the model” (IBM Knowledge Center).
[24]
No one same variable is included in more than one package.
[25]
VIF score of 1 indicates factors are not correlated.
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A. Package #1: GDP Per Capita Growth, Rural Population, Immigration n
The combination of variables of GDP per capita growth (X2), rural population,
percent of total population (X3), and international migrant stock, percent of total population
(X4) achieved adjusted R2 of 0.748. This suggests that 74.8 percent of the variability of the
vote is explained by these three explanatory variables. The Root Mean Square Error
(RMSE), which “indicates the absolute fit of the model to the data,” was recorded at 4.149,
implying that the standard deviation of the residuals (i.e., prediction errors) was 4.149. The
p-value of the F statistic computed in the ANOVA table, and the significance level of 5
percent, implies the information brought by the three explanatory variables is significantly
better than what a basic mean would bring. Based on Type III sum of squares

, GDP per

[26]

capita is the most influential among the variables. The equation of the model is:

Vote = 47.73215 + 3.20524 * GDP - 0.37469 * Rural + 0.24935 * Immigration
Goodness of Fit Statistics (Vote)
Observations

8.000

DF

4.000

R²

0.856

Adjusted R²
MSE

Multicolinearity Statistics
GDP

Rural

Immigration

Tolerance

0.991

0.994

0.997

VIF

1.009

1.006

1.003

0.748
17.211

RMSE

4.149

MAPE

5.421

Correlation Matrix
GDP

Rural

Immigration

Vote

1

-0.080

-0.055

0.832

Rural

-0.080

1

0.005

-0.437

Immigration

-0.055

0.005

1

0.112

Vote

0.832

-0.437

0.112

1

GDP

[26]

“Type III sum of squares have the following properties: “they test model comparisons that violate the principle
of marginality when testing main effects [;] they do not depend on the order of model terms [;] the individual
effect SS do not sum to the total effect SS [; and,] they test for the equality of unweighted marginal expected
values” (Wollschlaeger).
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Model Parameters (Vote)
Value

Standard
Error

t

Pr > |t|

Lower
Bound
(95%)

Upper
Bound
(95%)

47.732

7.747

6.161

0.004

26.223

69.242

GDP

3.205

0.753

4.258

0.013

1.115

5.295

Rural

-0.375

0.191

-1.962

0.121

-0.905

0.156

Immigration

0.249

0.298

0.837

0.450

-0.578

1.077

Source
Intercept

Predicted Vote vs. Observed Vote Proximity

The model suggests that right-wing populists will gain more votes when annual GDP per
capita growth and international migrant stock (percent of total population) increase, and
rural population (percent of total population) decreases. It is important to mention that the
immigration and rural population effects of this model are not particularly statistically
significant, based on the Pr > |t| parameters highlighted above. Given the low number of
cases, it is especially difficult to find statistically certain results. Nevertheless, the GDP per
capita effect appears to be statistically significant. Moreover, the regression of GDP per
capita growth, rural population, and ethnic fractionalization index achieves 0.758 adjusted
R2, which is a one percent increase from the original model.
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B. Package #2: Democratic Sentiment, Religious Influence, Ethnic Diversity
The combination of the satisfaction with democracy variable (X1), trust in religious
institutions (X3), and ethnic fractionalization index parameter (X4) achieved adjusted R2 of
0.743. This implies that, 74.3 percent of the variability of the dependent variable (vote) is
explained by the three explanatory variables. The Root Mean Square Error (i.e., standard
deviation of the residuals) was recorded at 4.190. The p-value of the F statistic computed
in the ANOVA table, and the significance level of 5 percent, implies the information brought
by the explanatory variables is significantly better than what a basic mean would bring.
Based on Type III sum of squares, ethnic fractionalization index parameter is the most
influential variable. The equation of the model is:

Vote = -8.52358 + 0.46183 * Democratic Sentiment + 0.50054 * Rel. Influence
+ 32.69338 * Ethnic Diversity
Goodness of Fit Statistics (Vote)
Observations

8.000

DF

4.000

R²

0.853

Adjusted R²

0.743

MSE

Multicolinearity Statistics
Democratic
Sentiment

Religious
Influence

Ethnic
Diversity

Tolerance

0.998

0.878

0.880

VIF

1.002

1.139

1.137

17.556

RMSE

4.190

MAPE

6.028

Correlation Matrix

Democratic
Sentiment
Religious
Influence
Ethnic
Diversity
Vote

Democratic
Sentiment

Religious
Influence

Ethnic
Diversity

Vote

1

0.040

-0.007

0.579

0.040

1

-0.347

0.399

-0.007

-0.347

1

0.442

0.579

0.399

0.442

1
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Model Parameters (Vote)

Source
Intercept
Democratic
Sentiment
Religious
Influence
Ethnic
Diversity

Value

Standard
error

t

Pr > |t|

Lower
bound
(95%)

Upper
bound
(95%)

-8.524

11.060

-0.771

0.484

-39.230

22.183

0.462

0.158

2.916

0.043

0.022

0.902

0.501

0.170

2.952

0.042

0.030

0.971

32.693

10.196

3.206

0.033

4.385

61.002

Predicted Vote vs. Observed Vote Proximity

The model suggests that right-wing populists may gain more vote share when citizens are
better satisfied with democracy/democratic way of life and have more trust in religious
institutions, and greater ethnic diversity exists within a country. It is worthy to highlight, if
variables of the two packages are mixed then slightly greater adjusted R2 is achieved.
When GDP per capita growth, satisfaction with democracy parameter, and ethnic diversity
variables are combined, adjusted R2 of 0.785 is recorded. Thus, representing a 0.037
increase in from package #1 and a 0.042 increase from package #2.
The opportunity structures presented by the two country-level packages “emphasize
the exogenous conditions for party success and, in so doing, contrast to actor-centered
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theories of success” (Tarrow 1998, 18). Yet as structures offer both opportunity and
constraint, and influence and are influenced by political actors—the addition of agency-level
analysis offers a more holistic perspective on the phenomenon of right-wing populism
(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005, 9). The agency-level empirical analysis is found in the
next chapter.
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Chapter VI
Empirical Party-Level (Agency-Level) Analysis

Analysis of populism ranges from examining the phenomenon as an ideology, a
form of social/political organization/movement, or an identity of political actors. The
binary assessment of a party if it is, in fact, populist or not appears not as important as
the measure to what degree does the actor embodies populist characteristics (DeeganKrause and Haughton 2009, 822-825). Particularly, since all parties regardless of
ideological leaning—to some extent—implement features of a populist rhetoric/political
style (Heino 2017, 5). Given the context-dependent, culture-bound, thus flexible nature
of populist politics—successful ideological policy positions correspondingly take unique
forms, which are constructed strategically (hence, on case-specific basis) to appeal to
“the people” that a populist actor targets on the basis of voter appeal and in harmony
with the opportunity structures of a nation. The observation highlights how relatively
fluid the populist—whether right-wing/authoritarian or not—political and social agenda
may be. This is, indeed, an opportunity for a populist party to construct its program in
a somewhat flexible, cherry-picking (from ideologies of Liberalism and Conservatism)
way. Nevertheless, populist parties are, like any other category of political actors,
“constrained by concerns over credibility [of their goals/ideological positions]” (Gidron
and Bonikowski 2013, 9). Despite the oftentimes ambiguous nature of populist
programs, it’s important to highlight how such styles of voter engagement/political
leadership, can in a significant way, reinvent and/or restructure “repertoires of political
mobilization, especially in the forms of mass social movements and socially engaged
party organizations” (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013, 2)
I.

Party-Level Empirical Analysis: Research Design and Findings
The party-level analysis conducts a cross-national comparison of ideological
policy positions (directly representative of the independent variables of my research)
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held by the identified in the prior chapter right-wing populist parties. I aim to report on
all correlations present between the parties’ policy stances and their electoral success, and
to suggest policy packages, which a modern right-wing Eastern European populist party
may offer to maximize its vote share. Some actors, which are part of the country-level
analysis, are excluded in the party-level analysis, if they are not present in the 2014
CHES dataset—needed for uniform comparison of party ideology/policy locations.
Therefore, a fourth criteria point—4) all of the actor’s ideological policy stands
(representative of the independent variables highlighted in the next paragraph) are
recorded in 2014 CHES dataset—is added to the party-level analysis selection, on top of
the country-level set of criteria. Figure 24 lists sixteen parties, which make up the
empirical party-level sample, and displays their related vote share (percent of total vote
share) in the most recent parliamentary election.
Figure 24: Party-Level Analysis Sample
Vote
Share

Seat
Share

2015

37.6

51.1*

Conservative

2014

44.9

66.0*

7.4

Conservative

2013

12.0

10.5

7.4

Conservative

2013

7.7

8.0

7.4

Conservative

2013

6.9

7.0

7.0

Social
Democracy

2014

20.7

23.3

7.9

Christian
Democracy

2014

5.6

5.6

7.4

Conservative

2016

11.0

12.7

7.9

Liberal

2015

27.7

29.7*

8.5

Conservative

2015

13.7

13.9

7.4

Conservative

2014

21.9

23.0

Party Name

L-R
Spectrum

Party Family

Year
Elected

Poland

Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)
[PiS]

7.7

Conservative

Hungary

Fidesz -- Hungarian Civic Party/Christian
Democratic People's Party (Coalition)
[Fidesz]

6.5

Country

The Czech
Republic

Slovenia

Slovakia
Estonia

Latvia

Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09
(Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita 09)
[TOP09]
Civic Democratic Party
(Občanská demokratická strana) [ODS]
Dawn of Direct Democracy
(Úsvit přímé demokracie) [USVIT]
Slovenian Democratic Party
(Slovenska demokratska stranka) [SDS]
New Slovenia -- Christian People's Party
(Nova Slovenija – Krščanska
ljudskastranka) [NSI]
Ordinary People and Independent
(Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti)
[OLaNO]
Estonian Reform Party
(Eesti Reformierakond) [ER]
Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica
(Erakond Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit)
[IRL]
Unity (Vienotība) [V]

(% of
Total)

(% of
Total)
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National Alliance All For Latvia -- For
Fatherland and Freedom / LNNK
(Nacionālā apvienība „Visu Latvijai!” –
„Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK”) [NA]
Latvian Association of Regions
(Latvijas Reģionu apvienība) [LRA]
For Latvia from the Heart (No sirds
Latvijai) [NSL]
Lithuania

Homeland Union (Tėvynės Sąjunga)
[TS-LKD]
Liberals Movement of the Republic of
Lithuania (Lietuvos Respublikos Liberalų
sąjūdis) [LRLS]

Note: 0—10 scale mean value in L/R dimension;

8.3

Right-wing

2014

16.6

17.0

7.4

Conservative

2014

6.7

8.0

7.4

Conservative

2014

6.9

7.0

7.4

Conservative

2016

22.6

22.0

7.8

Liberal

2016

9.5

9.9

“*” = highest number of seats in parliament

Data Source: ParlGov/CHES’14

The dependent variable (y) is represented by each of the identified parties’ vote share
in the most recent parliamentary election (referred to as “the vote”). The party-level
data parameters for the independent variables are the directly related CHES policy
dimensions, indicative of party ideological locations. Figure 25 lists the comprehensive
list of the CHES variables.
Figure 25: Independent Variables—Corresponding 2014 CHES Policy Data Parameters

Independent Variable

Corresponding
2014 CHES
Variable(s)/
Parameter(s)

X1:

Democratic Sentiment/
Satisfaction with Democratic
Way of Life

CIVLIB_LAWORDER

X2:

Economic Growth

LRECON

ECON_INTERVN

X3:

Religious Influence

Immigration and EU Sentiment

Position on civil liberties vs. law and order

Position of the party in 2014 in terms of its ideological
stance on economic issues

Position on state intervention in the economy

SPENDVTAX

Position on improving public services vs. reducing taxes

REDISTRIBUTION

Position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the
poor

RELIGIOUS_PRINCIPLE

Position on role of religious principles in politics

SOCIALLIFESTYLE

Position on social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality)

URBAN_RURAL

X4:

Description of Policy Dimension(s)

IMMIGRATE_POLICY

Position on urban vs. rural interests

Position on immigration policy
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MULTICULTURALISM

Position on integration of immigrants and asylum
seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation)

ETHNIC_MINORITIES

Position towards ethnic minorities

NATIONALISM

X5:

X6:

Inclination Towards
Authoritarian Rule

Loss of Party Leader

[27]

83

Position towards nationalism

CORRUPT_SALIENCE

Salience of reducing political corruption

ANTIELITE_SALIENCE

Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric

N/A
“Yes”/ “No” Indication

Did new party leadership arise either during the
election/reelection campaigning or approximately one
year prior to election?

The following two sections report on correlations and multivariate regressions present
between the parties’ ideological policy stances and electoral success. It is important to
mention that due to a high number of data parameters representative of the independent
variables (14 CHES variables) and a sample size of 16 cases (in eight countries)—it’s
extremely unlikely to produce significant systematic observations, as the data in the models
will likely be overdetermined. Hence, for the purposes of my thesis, the modeling served as
a technical exercise to combine two or three of my hypotheses and to suggest possible
policy packages.
A. X1: Democratic Sentiment/Satisfaction with Democratic Way of Life
The 2014 CHES data parameter, CIVLIB_LAWORDER, indicative of the party’s position on
civil liberties/democratic freedoms vs. law and order has a Pearson correlation coefficient of
0.458 with the vote, suggesting a somewhat moderate uphill association. The positive
relationship between the two variables is not particularly surprising given right-wing ideology
in democratic society, in general, favors tough measures to fight crime. To what degree this
flagship position is implemented in right-wing populist programs in Eastern Europe is more
complex, as the range of policy locations for the CIVLIB_LAWORDER variable is relatively

[27]

The sixth independent variable (loss of party leader) is not present in the country-level empirical analysis given
it is more significantly related to political party-level organization rather than structural/country-level forces.
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wide, spanning from 2.8 to 8.8. This observation supports how populist policies frequently
take contradictory shapes, which vary dramatically across geographies and times (Ionescu
and Gellner 1970, 1). Figure 26 displays the comprehensive results and lists the
corresponding scores ranked by vote share.
Figure 26: CIVLIB_LAWORDER Dimension Location
2014 CHES
Variable(s)/Parameter(s)
CIVLIB_LAWORDER

Country

Scale/Interpretation of
Policy Location
0 = Strongly promotes civil liberties
10 = Strongly supports tough measures to fight crime

Party

Vote

civlib_laworder

Fidesz

44.9

8.9

Poland

PiS

37.6

8.5

Estonia

ER

27.7

4.5

Lithuania

TS-LKD

22.6

6.2

Slovenia

SDS

20.7

7.4

Latvia

NA

16.6

6.1

Estonia

IRL

13.7

5.8

The Czech Republic

TOP09

12

4.1

Slovakia

OLaNO

11

6.8

Lithuania

LRLS

9.5

2.8

The Czech Republic

ODS

7.7

5.1

V

7.4

4.1

USVIT

6.9

8.6

Latvia

NSL

6.9

6.2

Latvia

LRA

6.7

6.2

Slovenia

NSI

5.6

6.7

Hungary

Latvia
The Czech Republic

Notably, Fidesz (Hungary) and Law and Justice, two parties with the highest vote
share in the sample, operate on a strong civil law and order policy platform. This is in line
with PiS’ cornerstone nationalist narrative of heroically protecting Poles from the alleged
social threats—for instance, crime caused by migrants/asylum-seekers, who are constructed
as “terrorists,” “thieves,” and “rapists,” in PiS’ dichotomous outlook of us vs. them; and,
form the heightened social inequality caused by corrupt political/economic elites, who broke
laws/regulations, in an effort to benefit their personal interests, while working against the
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national interest. In popular media, this is demonstrated by PiS’ frequent accusations that
the Civic Platform has illegally stolen resources from “ordinary” Poles and “sold off” Poland’s
economic machines (e.g., factories, businesses, sites of natural resources) to foreign/
“outsider” actors. Correspondingly, PiS’ program was strongly in favor of the return to the
nationalization of natural resources. It is worthy to mention, based on the country-level
analysis, Poles were most satisfied with the democratic way of life out of the entire sample.
Together with the party-level analysis, hence these themes reflect how powerful/influential
PiS’ constructed narrative of fear/social threats, along with the party’s proposition of tough
law and order platform as the protective remedy, truly were in 2015.
On a cross-national basis, although radical policy positions on law and order are not
common, it is worthy to mention that for twelve out of 16 parties, scores of at least 5 were
recorded for the corresponding CHES variable, suggesting the majority of right-wing
populist actors in Eastern Europe are somewhat more inclined to favor tough law and order
policy goals instead of initiatives focused on civil liberties. The essence of populism is in
fact its “worship of the people”—a theoretically democratic proposition (Ionescu and Gellner
1970, 4). Hence, this data observation sheds light on the culture-bound populist definition
of “the people.” For PiS, it appears “the people” are viewed not as stand-alone individuals
with necessary personal liberties to survive and prosper but instead as obligatory members
of a united community (which represents the interests and values of the majority) and
whom have duties associated with the “glorious” nation.
B. X2: Economic Growth
The economic policy dimensions are described by four CHES variables, chosen based
on right-wing populist economic positions witnessed throughout global history. The 2014
CHES data parameter, LRECON, indicative of whether a party wants the “government to
play an active role in the economy” (i.e., the economic left) or if it favors “a reduced
economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government
spending, and a leaner welfare state,” (i.e., economic right)—has a Pearson correlation
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coefficient of -0.468 with the vote, suggesting a somewhat moderate downhill association.
The ECON_INTERVN variable, which more specifically locates the actor’s position on state
intervention, has a -0.623 Pearson correlation coefficient with the vote, also indicating a
moderate to somewhat strong negative relationship. A -0.342 Pearson correlation
coefficient is recorded for the relationship between the vote and the SPENDVTAX,
representative of the position on tax spending for public services. This trend suggests a
weak negative association. The parameter indicative of wealth redistribution from the rich
to the poor has a -0.104 Pearson correlation coefficient with the vote, suggesting no
association or a very weak negative one.
As a whole, the noted above correlation trends suggest that ideologically leftist
economic positions of greater state intervention, rather than economically liberal initiatives,
are more frequently implemented by European right-wing populists. Naturally the majority
of the “common” people, i.e., the target group of populists, does not favor the businesspreferred option of less governmental intervention in the economic machines, especially
when populist parties oftentimes highlight the inefficiency and corruption within the
economic elites. PiS’ economically leftist economic agenda goes hand in hand with its social
welfare program, which grants a multitude of new and politically expedient benefits funded
by the government. The negative economic effects of added governmental expenditures on
a nation-state level are already arising, e.g., decreased GDP per capita growth. Figure 27
provides a comprehensive look at the economic policy locations. Notably, the only perhaps
somewhat surprising trend in the economic policy category is the very weak negative
association between wealth redistribution and the vote. Correspondingly, some definitions
of populism view the phenomenon “as the implementation of policies receiving support from
a significant fraction of the population, but ultimately hurting the economic interests of this
majority,” which is indicative of strong pro-redistribution positions, which populist leaders
manifest to signal to ordinary voters that they are not beholden to big economic interests”
(Acemoglu et.al 2013, 2). A geographic context-dependence is manifested, as populists in
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Latin America have in fact implemented strong pro-redistribution positions. It should also
be highlighted that the ethnic dimension of redistribution is blurring the results, i.e. a party
could be laissez faire and yet call for segmented redistribution in regards to its voters.
Figure 27: Economic Policy Dimension Location
2014 CHES
Variable(s)/Parameter(s)

Scale/Interpretation of Policy Location
0 = extreme left
5 = center

LRECON

10 = extreme right
0 = Fully in favor of state intervention
ECON_INTERVN

10 = Fully opposed to state intervention
0 = Fully in favor of raising taxes to increase public services

SPENDVTAX

10 = Fully in favor of cutting public services to cut taxes.
0 = Fully in favor of redistribution

REDISTRIBUTION

Country

10 = Fully opposed to redistribution

Party

Vote

lrecon

econ_interven

spendvtax

redistribution

Fidesz

44.9

3.7

1.6

5.6

7.4

Poland

PiS

37.6

3.1

2.9

3.3

2.6

Estonia

ER

27.7

8.3

8.3

7.5

8.3

Lithuania

TS-LKD

22.6

6.5

5.1

4.8

5.4

Slovenia

Hungary

SDS

20.7

8.6

7.7

7.9

7.0

Latvia

NA

16.6

5.9

6.6

5.6

5.9

Estonia

IRL

13.7

8.3

8.0

7.6

8.0

The Czech
Republic

TOP09

12

7.9

7.7

7.9

7.6

Slovakia

OLaNO

11

6.5

6.1

6.8

5.7

Lithuania

LRLS

9.5

8.6

8.4

8.2

8.3

The Czech
Republic

ODS

7.7

8.1

7.9

8.2

7.9

V

7.4

6.7

7.5

5.8

6.8

USVIT

6.9

5.3

5.5

4.0

4.0

Latvia

NSL

6.9

4.9

4.8

5.8

4.8

Latvia

LRA

6.7

5.6

5.5

5.8

5.4

Slovenia

NSI

5.6

8.1

8.1

7.8

7.1

Latvia
The Czech
Republic
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Yet again, the similarities between the policy agendas of Fidesz (Hungary) and Law and
Justice are striking. The two actors with the highest vote share in the sample, function on a
rather leftist economic platform. No clear significant pattern was noted for the remaining
countries, as the range of policy locations is relatively wide, highlighting the contextdependence of right-wing populism and its unique ability to adapt to a variety of
economic/social environments and voter preferences.
C. X3: Religious Influence
The 2014 CHES data parameter, RELIGIOUS_PRINCIPLE, indicative of a party’s
position on the role of religious principles in politics, has a Pearson correlation coefficient of
0.398 with the vote, suggesting a weak uphill association. The relatively weak strength of
the relationship is not particularly surprising since it appears that strategic
partnerships/alliances between politics and religious institutions are not the norm in most
Eastern European countries. Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia are the exceptions to this
observation—historically, not only religion served as a unifying and politically important
force during the policymaking processes but also religious institutions and their affiliates
(e.g., religious media) provide a means of voter engagement and mass mobilization for
political actors in these three relatively homogenous societies. This is directly reflected by
the data, as political parties in the three nations recorded the highest scores in the related
CHES variable, indicating strong support of religious principles in politics. As mentioned in
the party-level analysis chapter, religious belonging may serve as the unifying foundation of
the populist “heartland.” On a systematic scale, although such strong positions were not
noted in the remaining comparison countries, notably in eleven out of 16 cases scores of
above 5.0 were recorded, suggesting parties in Eastern Europe lean towards including
religious principles in politics.
Christian beliefs are closely aligned with politically conservative views on social
policies. The inclusion of the SOCIALLIFESTYLE CHES variable into the analysis allows to
gauge to what degree are religious principles incorporated into policy and to more
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holistically understand the social policy platform. The SOCIALLIFESTYLE CHES variable has
a 0.177 Pearson correlation coefficient with the right-wing populist vote, suggesting a very
weak positive relationship. The range of positions is relatively wide, spanning from 1.8 to
8.9 scores. Notably to highlight, in twelve out of 16 parties, scores of above 5.0 were
recorded, indicating right-wing populist actors lean towards opposing liberal policies in the
social policy debate. This is not surprising given the conservative nature of right-wing
ideology. NSI (Slovenia), PiS, and Fidesz (Hungary), respectively recorded the strongest
opposition to liberal social initiatives. Notably, Fidesz and PiS are the two nations with the
highest vote share, while NSI has the lowest electoral share. This once again highlights the
context-dependence of populism and the importance of a strategic policy package, with
multiple successful (in terms of voter appeal) policy dimensions. It appears that one strong
policy proposition or deliverable will not suffice. This sheds light on why populist programs
on a surface appear to—at times—have unconnected policy tendencies, while in reality they
are cherry-picking policy stands from competing ideologies of Liberalism and Conservatism.
Nevertheless, the focus on the people is always the underlying foundation emphasized in
populist discourse and political strategies. During my field study, 27 out of 40 participants
expressed either a positive or a somewhat neutral (e.g., “This issue doesn’t concern me”)
stand on same-sex marriage. Only 12 interviewees (most of whom were in the 18-25 years
age range) mentioned a pro-choice position, while 11 participants refused to express their
opinion on the topic of abortion. This perhaps highlights how liberal policies on social
lifestyle are not the majority view in the Eastern region of Poland, where the Catholic
Church is historically known to be a powerful social agent.
In fact, religious influences appear to be the most influential in rural regions of
Poland, thus highlighting a social divide between the urban and rural lived realities (Lyman
2016). To assess whether right-wing populist programs, in fact, systematically favor one
group over the other, the URBAN_RURAL CHES variable, which locates the position on urban
vs. rural interests, is added to the empirical analysis. The parameter has a 0.209 Pearson
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correlation coefficient with the vote, indicating a very weak uphill association.
Correspondingly with the country-level analysis, the data does not evidence that one
group’s interests are strongly favored over the other one’s. The range of policy locations is
wide, as the minimum position is recorded at 1.5 and maximum at 8.0, displaying direct
opposites on the priorities spectrum. PiS’ position was recorded at 6.8, suggesting to a
rather moderate degree a preference for rural interests—yet; it’s not nearly as extreme as
other PiS policy dimensions, such as civil law and order. Figure 28 provides a
comprehensive view of scores recorded for the religious influence independent variable.
Figure 28: Social Policy Dimension
2014 CHES
Variable(s)/Parameter(s)
RELIGIOUS_PRINCIPLE

Scale/Interpretation of
Policy Location
0 = Strongly opposes religious principles in politics
10 = Strongly supports religious principles in politics
0 = Strongly supports liberal policies

SOCIALLIFESTYLE

10 = Strongly opposes liberal policies
0 = Strongly supports urban interests

URBAN_RURAL

Country

10 = Strongly supports rural interests

Party

Vote

religious_principle

sociallifestyle

urban_rural

Fidesz

44.9

8.7

8.3

7.3

Poland

PiS

37.6

8.5

8.3

6.8

Estonia

ER

27.7

2.6

1.9

2.0

Lithuania

TS-LKD

22.6

3.0

4.1

3.0

Slovenia

SDS

20.7

8.2

8.5

7.1

Latvia

NA

16.6

4.9

5.5

3.0

Estonia

Hungary

IRL

13.7

5.4

7.4

6.1

The Czech
Republic

TOP09

12

8.0

7.7

3.4

Slovakia

OLaNO

11

6.8

4.4

3.3

Lithuania

LRLS

9.5

2.4

2.5

1.6

The Czech
Republic

ODS

7.7

7.0

7.9

5.7

V

7.4

5.2

5.5

3.4

USVIT

6.9

3.2

8.2

6.4

Latvia

NSL

6.9

6.8

7.0

4.0

Latvia

LRA

6.7

5.8

6.4

6.8

Latvia
The Czech
Republic

90

Koszykowska

Slovenia

NSI

5.6

8.7

8.9
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8.0

NSI, Fidesz, and PiS’ social policy outlooks are significantly similar. Slovenia, Hungary, and
Poland all have Christian majorities, which appears to have a relatively strong impact on
policymaking and political action in the realm of social lifestyle. This observation was also
noted during my field study, during which 24 out 40 interviewees stated they wish to see
the position of the Catholic Church remain as is, while only 12 participants hoped to see a
decrease of the institution’s influence in political affairs.
D. X4: Immigration and European Union Sentiment
Immigration policy, which in recent years also sheds light on a party’s sentiment
towards the European Union given the European migrant crisis and associated EU
designated migration quotas, is depicted by four key policy dimensions directly represented
by the following 2014 CHES variables: IMMIGRATE_POLICY, MULTICULTURALISM,
ETHNIC_MINORITIES, and NATIONALISM. The IMMIGRATE_POLICY parameter, which
positions immigration policy in terms of restrictiveness, has a Pearson correlation coefficient
of 0.029 with the right-wing populist vote, suggesting no linear association or a very weak
relationship—here, one that appears to be statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the
MULTICULTURALISM variable, indicative of the position on integration of immigrants and
asylum seekers (i.e., multiculturalism vs. assimilation) has a 0.219 Pearson correlation
coefficient with the vote; while the ETHNIC_MINORITIES, which locates the party’s position
of more vs. less rights for ethnic minorities, has a 0.215 Pearson correlation coefficient with
the vote. Both of these correlation trends indicate weak or very weak positive relationships.
Similarly, the NATIONALISM variable, which locates a party on a nationalist vs.
cosmopolitan conceptions of society spectrum, also has a weak or very weak positive
relationship with the vote, as the Pearson correlation coefficient is recorded at 0.294.
Despite the weak associations, importantly, top eight parties (including PiS) ranked based
on acquired vote share, all have scores of at least 5.0 in all four CHES variables, which
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indicates that European right-wing parties lean towards a program, which promotes a
nationalist rather than a cosmopolitan societal outlook, offers less rights for ethnic
minorities, and favors assimilation rather than multiculturalism. Such policy package
evidences a restrictive stand on immigration and laser focus on majority needs and
perspectives. This is in fact aligned with the populist narrative of social dichotomy, fear,
and the once glorious nation in need of a unifying populist program, which vows to save and
protect “the people” from the declared “outsiders” and “aliens.” Such overarching antimigrant and anti-diversity sentiments directly align with responses of participants in my
field study. Perhaps one could say that such a position is almost taken for granted with
regard to these parties.

All of them benefit from anti-immigration sentiment, which is why

the correlation cannot adequately differentiate between the examined parameters. Figure
29 provides a comprehensive list of CHES scores indicative of immigration policy.
Figure 29: Immigration and Inclusion Policy Dimension
2014 CHES
Variable(s)/Parameter(s)

Scale/Interpretation of Policy Location
0 = Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration

IMMIGRATE_POLICY

10 = Fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration
0 = Strongly favors multiculturalism

MULTICULTURALISM

10 = Strongly favors assimilation
0 = Strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities

ETHNIC_MINORITIES

10 = Strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities
0 = Strongly promotes cosmopolitan conceptions of society

NATIONALISM

Country

10 = Strongly promotes nationalist conceptions of society

Party

Vote

immigrate_policy

multiculturalism

ethnic_minorities

nationalism

Fidesz

44.9

7.8

7.8

7.4

8.8

Poland

PiS

37.6

6.2

8.0

7.1

8.2

Estonia

ER

27.7

5.1

6.3

6.9

5.4

Lithuania

TS-LKD

22.6

5.3

4.4

6.9

6.6

Slovenia

Hungary

SDS

20.7

7.8

8.0

7.2

8.1

Latvia

NA

16.6

6.5

7.1

8.6

8.1

Estonia

IRL

13.7

8.7

8.0

8.8

9.8
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The Czech
Republic

TOP09

12

6.1

6.8

5.8

7.1

Slovakia

OLaNO

11

5.0

6.0

4.8

3.8

Lithuania

LRLS

9.5

3.7

3.6

3.2

3.3

The
Czech
Republic

ODS

7.7

7.4

8.2

6.5

7.1

V

7.4

7.9

7.4

6.7

7.5

USVIT

6.9

9.4

9.7

9.6

9.2

Latvia

NSL

6.9

6.3

5.3

4.3

5.0

Latvia

LRA

6.7

6.3

6.8

5.8

6.3

Slovenia

NSI

5.6

7.4

8.2

6.2

7.6

Latvia
The
Czech
Republic

Important to the general discussion on politics—restrictive and fear-inducing (on individual
and collective (domestic) levels) immigration policy, implemented by right-wing populists
also has an effect on policies of mainstream parties, yet there is no consensus how
influential is the direct impact (Schain 2006).
E. X5: Inclination Towards Authoritarian Rule
Due to a strong anti-corruption sentiment, which lingers from the communist past,
PiS’ platform calculatedly emphasizes the dichotomy between “the ordinary people” vs. the
corrupt political establishment/elites directed by the Civic Platform. Based on the discourse
seen in the popular media, PiS successfully triggers voters’ agitation and/or anxiety about
corruption in the political and business circles/elites. In fact, under this justification, the
party not only uses authoritarian-like language focused on social conformity and strict law
and order but also spearheads anti-liberal and in practice anti-democratic laws/initiatives
(e.g., in part unconstitutional restructuring of the courts). The degree to which anticorruption and anti-elite policy stands are important, as well as, implemented in the party
political/social agenda is examined with the CORRUPT_SALIENCE and the
ANTIELITE_SALIENCE CHES variables. The CORRUPT_SALIENCE parameter has a
-0.340 Pearson correlation coefficient with the right-wing populist vote, suggesting a weak
negative (downhill) relationship between the two variables. The ANTIELITE_SALIENCE
variable has -0.094 Pearson correlation coefficient with the vote, suggesting either no
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association or a very weak negative one.

Both parameters have a wide range of location

points. A particularly interesting observation is how different Fidesz and PiS policy
dimensions are in this category. This may in part be explained by the fact that PiS was not
the incumbent in the most recent election, while the Fidesz party was. Hence, it was not
strategic for the Hungarian leadership to highlight corruption or inefficiencies created by
political/business elites and the establishment under their watch. Contrarily, it was
politically expedient for Law and Justice to overemphasize the corruption scandals of the
Civic Platform, in an effort to position themselves as the necessary new agent of change in
the eyes of the weary of corruption voters, and to gain “free” media with their oftentimescontroversial ripostes and staged provocations. Figure 30 displays the comprehensive view
on the corruption/anti-elite policy dimension.
Figure 30: Corruption and Anti-Elite Salience Policy Dimension
2014 CHES
Variable(s)/Parameter(s)
CORRUPT_SALIENCE

Scale/Interpretation of
Policy Location
0 = Not important at all
10 = Extremely important
0 = Not important at all

ANTIELITE_SALIENCE

Country

10 = Extremely important

Party

Vote

corrupt_salience

antielite_salience

Fidesz

44.9

2.9

4.6

Poland

PiS

37.6

8.8

7.5

Estonia

ER

27.7

5.0

1.0

Lithuania

TS-LKD

22.6

8.2

1.9

Slovenia

SDS

20.7

6.9

6.6

Latvia

NA

16.6

5.5

1.6

Estonia

Hungary

IRL

13.7

6.9

5.0

The Czech
Republic

TOP09

12

6.5

2.0

Slovakia

OLaNO

11

5.1

1.9

Lithuania

LRLS

9.5

6.5

1.5

The Czech
Republic

ODS

7.7

8.5

8.5

V

7.4

3.2

2.2

USVIT

6.9

8.6

9.5

Latvia
The Czech
Republic

94

Koszykowska

Latvia

NSL

6.9

8.1

9.0

Latvia

LRA

6.7

7.2

7.7

Slovenia

NSI

5.6

7.6

5.9
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Notably, PiS has the highest salience for reducing political corruption out of the sampled
actors. Anti-elite position is also relatively important for the party, yet it is not as high on
the list of priorities as the anti-corruption dimension. No clear pattern is noted for the
remaining agents in the sample, which brings to mind how not all right-wing populists
operate on an extreme policy platform and/or use radical authoritarian-like rhetoric.
Nevertheless, it is worthy to highlight that “the driving force of populist politics is the
weakness of democratic institutions, which makes voters believe that politicians, despite
their rhetoric (…) may be corruptible or unduly influenced by the elite [hence,] populist
policies thus [may] emerge as a way for politicians to signal that they will choose future
policies in line with the interests of the median voter [or the “populist” majority]” (Acemoglu
et. al 2011, 31). On the surface, this is, indeed, a very democratic proposition; yet, the
means used to accomplish this goal in practice are frequently authoritarian-like, given many
populists prefer to streamline democratic processes under the justification of politically
expedient time efficiency (Heino 2017, 8).
F. X6: Loss of Party Leader
The populist persuasion appears to resonate particularly well with the voters in postcommunist Eastern European countries. The common touch relatable to the greater
majority of voters and free of stigma of corruption is a unique trait of populist leaders.
Moreover, a typical populist tends to position himself/herself strategically “as an outsider
who gains political prominence not through or in association with an established,
competitive party, but as a political independent or in association with new or newly
competitive parties” (Espejo et al. 2017). Populists’ lack of desire to be mainstream political
leaders, oftentimes results in unorthodox, perhaps, politically incorrect discourse that is
fueled and intensified by the uncovering of supposed social taboos and issues. In fact,
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“political correctness and dominant discourses are at the same time the declared enemies of
right-wing populists and their greatest friends” (Greven 2016, 1). Hence, the analysis of
populist leadership appears to be particularly important to the discussion on right-wing
populism. In Poland, Pawel Kukiz, the 2015 presidential independent candidate with
experience as a rock musician but no formal political training and who gained 20.8 percent
of total vote share, exemplifies the “outsider” charismatic right-wing populist leader.
More crucially to the focus of my thesis, Law and Justice also internally selected a
new, relatively unrecognized, yet vibrant presidential candidate—Andrzej Duda. This was
an especially successful tactical move as the long-time leader of the party, Lech Kaczynski,
is frequently stigmatized and ridiculed by many voters, particularly in the younger age
groups. It is worthy to highlight, Kaczynski’s influence within the party, as well as the
policymaking process did not decrease when Duda won the election. The benefit of a new,
allegedly uncorrupt outsider actor appears to play a significant role in PiS’ 2015 victory.
What additionally escalated this benefit was a poorly managed campaign of the party’s key
rival—the Civic Platform. When Donald Tusk, the charismatic leader of PO, resigned in
September 2014 due to his appointment to the position of President of the European
Council—internal party power-struggles and disagreements over policy goals followed
quickly. This occurrence set stage for a well-timed platform to promote PiS’ new
presidential candidate, when the opponent underwent transitional conflicts and was
significantly less focused on the reelection campaigns. PO’s loss of rule raises
questions whether in 2008 Poles voted for the Civic Platform (the party) or in fact for
Donald Tusk (the leader).
When examining the actors in the sample it should be pointed out that, ER
(Estonia), the third party when ranked by vote share acquired (28.6 percent), also selected
a new party leader a year before elections. Andrus Ansip, the party chairman and at the
time Prime Minister of Estonia, left for his appointment to the European Commission.
Similarly, in Lithuania, the TS-LKD party, which gained 15.1 percent of the total vote, also
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experienced party power struggles leading up to the most recent election. In 2013, during
the party leadership election, a clear tension between “Andrius Kubilius [the “only
Lithuanian PM to have served a full parliamentary term in office”] and the party’s original
leader, Vytautas Landsbergis, who served as one of the party’s MEPs,” manifested (The
Democratic Society). Given no other transitional changes are recorded for the remaining
comparison political parties and the case-specific nature of this category, no systematic
conclusions can be drawn. Nevertheless, the charisma of a populist leader who is perceived
by the voters as the—uncorrupt by the political establishment and elite influences—outsider
appears to be politically expedient, as suggested by the success of PiS and ER.
II.

The Proximity Matrix: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
The proximity matrices highlighted below provide a summarized view of all
Pearson correlation coefficients between the party-level data parameters representative
of all independent variables (excluding X6, i.e., loss of party leader). To recap,
CIVILB_LAWORDER (Pearson coefficient of 0.458) and RELIGIOUS_PRINCIPLE variable
(Pearson coefficient of 0.398) had the highest positive correlations with the vote. The
economic intervention (Pearson coefficient of -0.623) and the LRECON variable
(Pearson coefficient of -0.468), representative of governmental role in the economy,
have the highest negative correlation with the vote.
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IV.

Multivariate Regressions: Key Party-Level Policy Packages
The party-level packages propose strategic combinations of policy dimensions, which

maximize the right-wing populist vote dependent on the degree to which the included in the
model variables are implemented into the actor’s political agenda. The model with the
greatest explanatory power suggests that right-wing populists may gain more electorate
share with a package that is in favor of greater state intervention into the economy
(indicative of leftist economic stand), promotes more nationalist conceptions of society
rather than cosmopolitan propositions, and implements less anti-elite/anti-establishment
rhetoric. The analysis was computed in the following way. Multivariate linear regressions
(confidence interval of 95 percent; tolerance level of 0.10) of the variables, analyzed in the
prior sections of the chapter, were performed to attempt to find the most statistically
significant party-level policy packages that result in highest vote share of right-wing populist
parties. The accuracy of the models/packages was chiefly based on 1) achieving the
greatest adjusted R2—which represents the “corrected

[28]

goodness-of-fit measure for linear

models [and] identifies the percentage of variance in the target field that is explained by the

[28]

“R2 tends to optimistically estimate the fit of the linear regression. It always increases, as higher number of
effects is included in the model. Adjusted R2 attempts to correct for this overestimation. It might decrease if the
effect does not improve the model” (IBM Knowledge Center).
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variables that have at most moderate correlations with each other

(i.e., less than 0.50 Pearson coefficient) and on 2) keeping the variance inflation factors
(VIF), which measures how much multicollinearity exists, at low or at most moderate levels
(i.e., 1 < VIF < 2.5) [30] (IBM Knowledge Center). Given the CHES variables are in most
cases moderately or highly correlated with each other—only one policy package with a
relatively high adjusted R2 fulfilled the model criteria. It is important to disclose that policy
packages with high adjusted R2 and relatively high correlation coefficients between included
policy dimensions were also recorded. To offer a more complete range of possible policy
packages, those options are briefly highlighted.
A. Package #1: ECON_INTERVEN, NATIONALISM, ANTIELITE_SALIENCE
The combination of variables of ECON_INTERVEN (X2), NATIONALISM (X4), and
ANTIELITE_SALIENCE (X5) achieved adjusted R2 of 0.533. This suggests that 53.3 percent
of the variability of the dependent variable (vote) is explained by these three explanatory
variables. The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), which “indicates the absolute fit of the
model to the data,” was recorded at 8.075, implying that the standard deviation of the
residuals (i.e., prediction errors) was 8.075. The p-value of the F statistic computed in the
ANOVA table, and the significance level of 5 percent, implies the information brought by the
three explanatory variables is significantly better than what a basic mean would bring.
Based on Type III sum of squares,

[31]

ECON_INTERVEN is the most influential among the

variables. The equation of the model is:

vote = 48.93017 - 4.87913 * econ_interven + 1.23840 * nationalism
- 2.18978 * antielite_salience
[29]

No one same variable is included in more than one package.
VIF score of 1 indicates factors are not correlated.
[31]
“Type III sum of squares have the following properties: “they test model comparisons that violate the principle
of marginality when testing main effects [;] they do not depend on the order of model terms [;] the individual
effect SS do not sum to the total effect SS [; and,] they test for the equality of unweighted marginal expected
values” (Wollschlaeger).
[30]
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Goodness of Fit Statistics (Vote)
Observations

16.000

DF

12.000

R²

0.627

Adjusted R²

0.533

MSE

Multicolinearity Statistics

econ_interven

nationalism

antielite_salience

Tolerance

0.721

0.828

0.727

VIF

1.387

1.208

1.376

65.207

RMSE

8.075

MAPE

44.061

Correlation Matrix
econ_interven

nationalism

antielite_salience

Vote

1

-0.362

-0.487

-0.623

econ_interven
nationalism

-0.362

1

0.353

0.294

antielite_salience

-0.487

0.353

1

-0.094

Vote

-0.623

0.294

-0.094

1

Model Parameters (Vote)
Value

Standard
Error

t

Pr > |t|

Lower
Bound
(95%)

Upper
Bound
(95%)

Intercept

48.930

13.985

3.499

0.004

18.459

79.401

econ_interven

-4.879

1.223

-3.990

0.002

-7.544

-2.215

nationalism

1.238

1.238

1.000

0.337

-1.459

3.935

antielite_salience

-2.190

0.800

-2.738

0.018

-3.932

-0.447

Source

Predicted Vote vs. Observed Vote Proximity
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The model suggests that right-wing populists may acquire more vote share with a package
that is in favor of greater state intervention into the economy (indicative of leftist economic
leaning), promotes more nationalist conceptions of society rather than cosmopolitan
propositions, and implements less anti-elite/anti-establishment rhetoric. It is important to
mention that the nationalism effect of this model is not particularly statistically significant,
based on the Pr > |t| results highlighted above. Given the small sample, it is especially
challenging to find statistically certain results. Following this model, PiS would have gained
more votes if the party downgraded its anti-elite discourse.
It is worthy to also highlight that the policy combination of greater state
intervention into the economy, low anti-elite salience, and tough civil law and order
initiatives results in an adjusted R2 of 0.642, thus offering a 0.109 increase in explanatory
power when compared to package #1. Yet, importantly, CIVILB_LAWORDER,
ECON_INTERVEN, and ANTIELITE_SALIENCE variables are highly correlated with each other,
hence exposing the model to heightened concerns of statistical insignificance. Another
combination, which provides relatively high explanatory power, consists of
CIVILB_LAWORDER, LRECON, and ANTIELITE_SALIENCE CHES variables. The package of
policies, which aim to provide greater governmental role in the economy, alongside tough
civil law and order initiatives and low anti-elite salience, accomplishes an adjusted R2 of
0.592 but also runs into the problem of highly correlated variables. It is important to again
stress that right-wing populism is a context-dependent/elastic phenomenon, which adapts
itself to a specific political climate, as well as exogenous structural conditions of a nation
state. Hence, the highlighted packages serve the purpose of technical exercises aimed to
suggest possible policy platforms, which may not be at all be transferrable or useful to the
study of right-wing populism in regions outside of post-communist Eastern European
countries.
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Chapter VII
Conclusions

Constructive debate, without demonizing remarks, of the widely contested
phenomenon of right-wing populism in Europe appears to be necessary today, since
authoritarian populism has emerged as the “third ideological tide in European politics, next
to Conservatism/Christian Democracy and Social Democracy [, notably surpassing
Liberalism in terms of voter appeal]” (Heino 2017, 4). In fact, the social, economic, and
political impacts of this occurrence are unraveling as this thesis is being written and will
continue to unfold its imprint on the political and social climate in the near future, given the
already implemented structural changes by modern populist actors. Due to the multifaceted, context-dependent, and culture-bound nature of populism—the analysis of the
ideology is complex and it has been argued from various social and political perspectives,
and with a wide array of methodological approaches. Due to the broad scope of debate,
overly generalized findings about universal populist features are depicted in the academic
and secular domains (Acemoglu et al. 2011). Despite the ambiguous and widely varied
policy goals of populist programs, three similarities of the phenomenon that are also
supported by the majority of academic intelligentsia, stood out during my research process.
First, the essence of populism is “the people,” which serves as its undisputed
underlying foundation. Populism is not by default an antagonistic ideology as the world’s
popular media too often vividly paints it to be. Due to the, at times provocative and
politically incorrect (if compared to mainstream actors), communication style, populist
politics oftentimes creates enticing news for the “infotainment” media, which diminishes the
debate’s importance and gives populism a relatively negative reputation, hence, skewing
the general public opinion of the topic. Therefore, a populist actor will not label
himself/herself as such due to the adverse sentiment associated with the term.
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Secondly, the populist narrative is constructed based on structural, thus, nationally
specific factors (which oftentimes on the surface appear to be unconnected) and in result
either justly exposes or strategically overemphasizes societal issues and threats to position
itself as the ultimate remedy for the voters’ anxieties and disappointments. Populism’s
central and frequently streamlined narrative is generally constructed on a dichotomy of us
(“the people”) vs. the antagonist (“the nation’s enemy”). The villain in the populist
proposition takes unique forms based on cultural, demographic, and economic forces seen
in a civil society, e.g., corrupt business/political elites, “dangerous” migrants, religious
minorities. Claims that populist narratives are by default xenophobic and/or racist are
oversimplified, yet are hard to fully dispute given the policies presented by current rightwing populist actors, such as Law and Justice or Fidesz. Nevertheless, the driving force of
the populist agenda aims to fight for the interests of “the people,” which as precedented by
successful (i.e., in terms of acquiring electorate share) actors, in practice represents the
majority interests, highlighting the exclusionist predisposition of populism. Importantly,
inclusionary populist policies are possible, as exemplified by Lech Walesa, who momentously
united Poles to fight against communist rule in the 1980’s. Crucially, populist rule, whether
right-wing or not, due to it’s oftentimes heroic and nonpolitical (as perceived by the voters)
focus, has the platform to redraw moral boundaries of a nation. This may either
momentously unify citizens to pursue a noble goal, in the name of national progress, or it
may create heightened social stratification and polarization.
The third feature is related to the common denominator, which appears to connect
populists across times and geographies. The importance of belonging and voters’ sense of
trust-inducing community, or what Taggart refers to as the “implicit or explicit heartland,”
built by populists appears to be politically expedient (Taggart 2012). Populist leaders in this
utopia-like community of fellowship design their vision by adjusting it to what, simply put,
feels relatable to the target voter group. The populist persuasion draws on ordinary
commonalities between the voters, their struggles and sources of anxieties, as well as of
103

fulfillment and motivation—to provide—an uncomplicated and frequently unattainable or if
attainable then at a significant country-level economic cost—policy platform and narrative.
To that end, populist propositions have the potential to be somewhat illusionary and eerily
psychologically influential especially to strict proponents, or missionary-like believers, of
specific populist actors. For instance, such narratives on precedent have induced into the
public opinion a heightened sense of loss, individual/systematic oppression caused by the
symbolic “enemy,” or backwardness of progress. The populist means of mass engagement
may serve as a tactical way to persuade voters of more extreme policy stands alongside the
actors’ vows to bring back the glory of the past. The “heartland” appears to be a —
particularly powerful and important to the success of mass mobilization— source of
solidarity when members of the community are united by a common source of anger and
provided with a space to be heard and identified with others who appear familiar. This
power of social-movement-like collectivity is depicted by Freud’s conception of herd instinct,
which highlights that “a successful leader invites the crowd to identify with him . . . and is at
once larger-than-life and familiar, bigger than I am and just like me. He’s heroic and at the
same time recognizably human” (Lunbeck). In my opinion, a politician’s achievement of
this balance is the crucial, and necessary, foundation for the success of right-wing populist
actors. It is then when victorious political players are perceived as one of the “the virtuous
people” and are guided by principals familiar to the demos and their lived reality, hence,
providing an in-touch perspective with the interests of the ordinary voters, as opposed to
elites or other nation-specific stigmatized actors.
Historically voters’ anxieties and fears have provided a justifiable platform for a
right-wing populist program to emerge successfully. Public opinion along with a large
portion of the popular media around the world portray the force of globalization and the
actions and processes associated with it, as the major source of voters’ disappointments
and dislocation, both on social and economic grounds. After conducting my research, I
believe that it is not globalization itself that is the root cause of voters’ discontent, which in
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result pushes the public to vote for a populist, non-mainstream program. In my opinion, it
is the mainstream political parties’ inability to adapt amply (or perceive to adapt) to social
change, hence global progress. Inevitably, this observation is oversimplified given the
nation-specific nature of voter preferences and the culture-bound gamma of social/economic
circumstances in which right-wing populists gain momentum. Yet, it may provide a mental
framework to analyze the multi-faceted intellectual puzzles, such as Poland, where despite a
relatively healthy economic state and no overwhelming social instability, voters chose a
right-wing populist leader, and, notably in a momentous way given the high vote share
acquired. The voters’ perception of their inability to adapt to change or to the loss of their
privileged social and/or economic status arisen due to the new competitive global forces,
also appears to serve as a sufficient platform for populist leaders to (over)emphasize the
perceived anxieties and offer a “saving” policy package. Theoretically, this is a just and
democratic proposition, as political actors organize to alleviate the disadvantaged citizens.
Yet, it has the potential to result in authoritarian-like actions, as seen in the case of PiS,
which in the process of pursuing citizen-empowering initiatives continues to streamline
principles of democratic discipline.
More specifically, in addressing the question of why did Law and Justice win the 2015
elections, a combination of structural and agency-level discourse, as well as empirical
analysis offers some insights. On a country level, statistical analysis reveals that GDP per
capita (Pearson coefficient of 0.832) and the satisfaction with democracy variable (Pearson
coefficient of 0.579) have the highest positive correlations with the vote. While inclination
towards authoritarian rule parameter (Pearson coefficient of -0.588) has the highest
negative correlation with the dependent variable. Based on a cross-national comparison,
two country-level opportunity structures in which a right-wing populism program may
possibly rise to power and obtain a vote share, dependent on the degree to which the
variables exist in a nation, were highlighted. The first one consists of a high annual GDP per
capita growth, large international migrant stock, and a small rural population. While the
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second highlighted opportunity structure is embodied when citizens are greatly satisfied
with democracy/democratic way of life, have more trust in religious institutions, and the
population is significantly ethnically diverse. It is crucial to highlight that, given the
context-dependent and culture-bound nature of populism and the small sample size of my
analysis; the suggested opportunity structures may not accurately portray populism-inviting
country-level forces on a systematic scale. My research is only a first step—a closer look at
more elections, countries, and parties is an opportunity for future research aimed to
discover more statistically significant conclusions about right-wing populism. In my future
research, I also hope to include additional independent variables, e.g., one that analyzes
the organizational competence of opponents of right-wing populism who attempted to
counteract the force in the countries of analysis.
My empirical findings on the party-level reveal that CIVILB_LAWORDER (Pearson
coefficient of 0.458) and RELIGIOUS_PRINCIPLE variable (Pearson coefficient of 0.398)
have the highest positive correlations with the vote. The economic intervention
(Pearson coefficient of -0.623) and the LRECON variable (Pearson coefficient of -0.468),
representative of governmental role in the economy, have the highest negative
correlation with the vote. Correspondingly, the policy package that appears to be most
strategic for right-wing populists to function on includes greater state intervention into
the economy (i.e., leftist economic leaning), promotion of more nationalist conceptions
of society rather than cosmopolitan propositions and implements less anti-elite/antiestablishment rhetoric. Following this model, PiS would’ve gained more votes in 2015 if
the party downgraded its anti-elite discourse, as it already functions on an economically
leftist platform. Moreover, since in the next election the party may be considered an
elite themselves, it’s possible that PiS’ anti-elite sentiment will decline.
It appears that the victory of Law and Justice can, unsurprisingly, be attributed to a
combination of structural and agency-level factors, which include the anti-corruption/antielitist sentiment lingering from the communist past, which was aligned with PiS’ anti106
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establishment rhetoric; the loss of Civic Platform’s charismatic leadership; a strong domestic
economy, which provided a justification for PiS to vow for additional social welfare benefits;
and, the strategic alliance between the party and the Catholic Church and its affiliated
media satellites, which enabled the unique means of voter mobilization. The party’s policy
package of leftist economic initiatives, which offered extra social welfare benefits to Polish
families with at least two children, and the nationalist narrative of returning to Poland’s
greatness, in an effort to better the country for its citizens rather than the
political/economic elites, appear to have significant impact on voters’ decisions in 2015. It
may be inferred, that a combination of structural forces along with a narrative of economic
and social development for “ordinary” voters landed PiS in office.
The impacts of the party’s rule are still unraveling. Yet, negative economic and
social implications are intensifying, rapidly. For instance, PiS’ anti-democratic reforms such
as a law that prohibited media to be present during parliamentary meetings, and the
unconstitutional restructuring of the courts scandal; alongside, the conservative social
reforms, e.g., stricter abortion laws; significantly more Eurosceptic positions, which sparked
EU-led actions against Poland; as well as weaker GDP per capita growth, in terms of
economic effects. Also, it is worthy to mention the heightened social/political polarization
witnessed in the nation, as suggested by the sharp rise in public protests and an increase in
grassroots movements (Berezow 2016). It appears that societal tensions are not projected
to decrease, as the party has made its policy goals more extreme and exclusionary since
taking office three years ago.
The phenomenon of right-wing populism in established liberal democracies is
complex, yet crucial to debate given the somewhat turbulent international relations
landscape today. It is oversimplified to state that all right-wing populist programs are
antagonistic in nature. As Cas Mudde posits, “maybe the arguments of populist are true
and that could explain why they are so successful” (2004:553). In Poland, this appears to
be the preferred majority opinion but the effects of PiS’ rule may not be fully examined just
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yet, as such social and political transformation requires ample time to restructure fully
institutional and moral boundaries of a nation. Perhaps the best impact of the popularity of
right-wing populism in Eastern Europe is that it sparks public debate on how to improve the
democratic way of life and encourages analysts to search for appealing-to-voters policies,
which will empower “ordinary” citizens, while not eroding the liberal democratic structures
and principals.
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Appendix

I.

Questionnaire Used for Small-Scale Public Survey/Field Study (Poland, 2018)

Part I: Anonymous Multiple-Choice Survey
1. Did you vote in the presidential election of 2015?
A. Yes
B. No
2. Please select your age range.
A.
B.
C.
D.

18-25 years old
26-35 years old
36-55 years old
56+ years old

3. Are you a Bialystok resident?
A. Yes
B. No
If choice (B) was selected, please specify your state:______________________
4. Were you satisfied with the Civic Platform’s rule from 2007 until 2015?
A. I was somewhat satisfied.
B. I was satisfied.
C. I was not satisfied.
5. If you participated in the 2015 presidential election, please select the candidate that you
voted for in the second round of the 2015 presidential election.
A.
B.
C.
D.

Andrzej Duda, PiS
Bronislaw Komorowski, PO
Pawel Kukiz, Independent
Other candidates

6. Please select the key reason why you voted for the candidate indicated in question 5.
A. The candidate’s political agenda on social issues resonated with me the most.
B. The candidate’s political agenda on economic issues resonated with me the most.
C. I voted for the party (rather than the candidate) I identify with the most/I’m
affiliated with.
D. It was a combination of all of the choices described above.
Other reasons:____________________________________________________
7. Did you vote in the presidential election of 2008?
C. Yes
D. No
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8. Did you change the party you voted for in 2008?
A. Yes
B. No
9. Do you believe Poland should exit the European Union?
A. Yes
B. No
10. Please select the statement that depicts your level of satisfaction with the current rule
(PiS).
A. I’m somewhat satisfied.
B. I’m satisfied.
C. I’m not satisfied.
Part II: Interview
1. What is the most important problem Poland faces today? Which party best addresses it?
2. Do you believe Poland should remain in the European Union? How would you be affected
if Poland exited?
3. Do you believe Poland should open its borders to more immigrants?
4. What are your views on same-sex marriage? What is your stand on abortion?
5. Would you like to see the Catholic Church be more or less involved in the political
affairs? What are your thoughts on the religious media?
6. Should the Polish government provide more social benefits to its citizens? Are you in
favor of PiS’ PLN500+ policy (i.e., families with 2+ children receiving monthly allowance of
PLN500 per child)?
7. What is your opinion on the health of the Polish economy? Do you expect it to grow in a
healthy pace in the upcoming years?
8. Do you believe there is a divide between rural and city residents?
9. How does the Polish post-communist sentiment affect politics today?
10. Did you vote in the 2015 elections? If so, who did you vote for in the second round of
2015 presidential elections and in the parliamentary election? Explain why.
11. What were the most important factors you considered when deciding on who to vote
for? Do you disagree with any part of the political agenda of the party that you voted for?
12. What qualities do you value the most in a politician? How did you react to the 2015
political campaigns? Was there anything in particular that resonated with you the most?
13. How do you envision Poland next year/ in 5 years? What party would you like to see in
power?
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